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Introduction 
One of the major impediments to financing adaptation to climate 
change is the legal mechanisms thus far developed that control financing 
adaptation to climate change. 
“Common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) is not only an 
emerging principle of customary international environmental law; it is also 
the ethical and legal anchor of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)1 and the Kyoto Protocol.2  Those who have contributed 
least to global climate change will bear the greatest burden of its ravages. 
While CBDR requires that all nations contribute to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, developed (“Northern”3) nations have a legal 
obligation to make greater contributions.  The legal obligations encoded in 
the climate change conventions, which require disparate contributions to 
mitigation and adaptation, stem from pragmatic reality rooted in ethical 
obligation.  Pragmatically, those nations who have the resources to mitigate 
and help others adapt bear primary responsibility to do so; ethically, because 
those resources are derived from activities that pollute(d) the global 
commons, polluting nations should bear the primary responsibility to clean 
up the global atmospheric commons and help others adapt to the mess we 
have made en route to economic ascendancy. 
However, under the Kyoto Protocol, various “flexibility mechanisms” 
allow Northern nations and private actors to avoid meeting their committed 
amount of emissions reductions.  Instead, they can trade credits allowing 
pollution, and offset emissions by investing in Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing (Southern) nations.4  Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, these CDM projects are also the primary means of helping 
Southern nations adapt to global climate change.5  Financial and legal 
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter]. 
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
3. Or “Annex 1” nations in the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.  I will use the more
general “Northern” and “Southern” nations throughout. 
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Articles 6, 12, & 17.  The Clean Development
Mechanism allows Northern nations or private entities to continue to emit a certain 
amount of greenhouse gases in exchange for reducing emissions the same amount 
in a Southern nation.  
5. Ian H. Rowlands, Atmosphere and Outer Space, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 315, 331 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
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systems that harness these flexibility mechanisms are developing with 
breakneck speed under the formal international legal regime, and an 
exploding voluntary market in carbon trading and carbon offsets rides their 
coattails (or, more accurately, leads).  Actors in the North have invested 
much ingenuity in developing systems of greenhouse gas trading and offsets 
that have overshadowed international negotiations on creative, effective, 
alternative next steps to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Northern actors are allowed to continue to 
emit greenhouse gases to the extent that they “offset” those emissions 
through reforestation efforts, often in the global South.6  In the voluntary 
market, private actors develop reforestation or “avoided deforestation” 
projects, whose carbon credits they sell to investors.  Many private actors in 
the global North profit economically from forest carbon offset (“FCO”) 
projects that may help local human and nonhuman communities in the 
global South adapt to climate change, but that may also do them more harm 
than good. 
At the heart of the critique I offer of most current FCO adaptation 
schemes is this: FCOs are not often based on ecological necessity, 
sustainable development needs, or on the legal/ethical obligation of 
common but differentiated responsibility.  Rather, they focus on economic 
efficiency.  The criteria for much international climate change “aid” is not 
necessarily about mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, helping developing 
nations or poor communities adapt, or conserving biodiversity.  Instead, a 
coterie of actors with overlapping interests has devised complex systems 
that turn environmental obligations into efficient economic transactions. 
FCOs often focus on economic expediency as the primary criterion in 
mitigation and adaptation, while doing little to help the poor adapt, which is 
exactly the opposite of what CBDR proposes and requires.  A major 
challenge to helping Southern nations cope with global climate change is to 
scuttle this economic focus and instead make genuine adaptation the focus 
and not an afterthought of the international climate legal regime.  This is 
linked to an even greater challenge of developing robust international legal 
institutions capable of constraining capitalism in order to ensure the 
continued health and survival of human communities and the ecological 
communities on which humans depend. 
In this paper, I first provide an overview of the treaty framework for 
global climate change mitigation and adaptation.  I explain the legal 
principles – both grounded in the treaty and based on customary norms – 
that could or do provide the basis for judging actors in climate change 
adaptation.  I explain how deforestation contributes to global climate 
6. U.N. ENV. PROGR. [UNEP] RISOE CENTRE, LEGAL ISSUES GUIDEBOOK TO THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 42 (2004), http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/CDM%20 
Legal%20Issues%20 Guidebook.pdf. 
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change, and how forest carbon offsets propose to staunch this problem. 
Through case studies, I explain the major players in both the CDM and 
voluntary market in forest carbon offsets, and how they have created a 
system where they benefit economically without necessarily doing much to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, conserve biodiversity, or help the poor 
adapt to the effects of climate change.  I close with a legal analysis of FCOs, 
and I propose how to use the law to foment genuine adaptation, including 
judicious use of carefully implemented and monitored FCOs, in the global 
South.  I point to several efforts that are under way to do so, but also point 
to the need for strengthened systems of international environmental and 
human rights law capable of monitoring and enforcing FCOs. 
I do not intend this article as a screed against capitalism.  I am not 
critiquing the general notion of doing well by doing good; in fact, I entered 
into this research hopeful that I would find a paradigmatic example of how 
linking social entrepreneurship to capitalism could help save the world by 
mitigating greenhouse gas accumulation, using markets to help poor 
communities adapt to global climate change, and saving biodiversity at the 
same time, while providing the “do-gooder” entrepreneurs with a living. 
While I still believe this is possible, it will require much more attention to 
international human rights and environmental law, and development of 
mechanisms that craft, monitor, and enforce these laws.  Indeed, some 
efforts are underway that would do much more to promote ecological and 
social resiliency in FCOs; I will discuss them below. 
However, to the extent that capitalist actors can be judged by their 
deeds (not their words), the past decade in FCOs has largely seen the market 
replace law and governance, and profit trump social welfare or ecological 
function.  Projects to sequester carbon in forests have allowed the wealthy 
to sequester further wealth far out of proportion to the carbon sequestered. 
Without a robust system of international legal principles and enforcement 
mechanisms, I believe that tropical forests will continue to disappear, 
greenhouse gas concentrations will continue to rise, and the poor (and 
perhaps the rich) will be unable to adapt successfully to global climate 
change. 
Global Climate Change and Forest Carbon Offsets 
Industrialization has come with many costs, including widespread 
pollution of the global atmospheric commons.  As greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) accumulate in the atmosphere at concentrations significantly 
above pre-industrial levels, scientists have sounded the alarm about the 
consequences these changes in GHG concentrations portend for human and 
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nonhuman communities.7  In recent years, alert citizens and political leaders 
have heeded these alarms about global climate change, and have begun to 
press for changes to business as usual. 
Climate change threatens survival of many species in temperate and 
tropical ecosystems, and threatens the functioning of those ecosystems 
themselves.  For humans, climate change will hit the poor particularly hard,8 
as they lack the means to adapt to deepening drought, more violent storms, 
elevated heat, increasing floods from melting glaciers, rising sea levels, and 
various other (un-) natural9 phenomena.  Political and policy responses to 
climate change have addressed both mitigation and adaptation.  First, it has 
seemed sensible to try to reduce the rate at which GHGs are accumulating in 
the atmosphere, thus mitigating the problem.  But given that the wheels of 
climate change have already been set in motion and, despite legal and 
voluntary responses, GHG concentrations are still increasing.  Therefore, 
programs to help human populations adapt to global climate change must 
also be established.  When I refer to “adaptation” in this paper, I am referring 
to building ecological and social community resiliency to climate change. 
7. See, most recently, the statement posted by the National Science Academies
of 13 nations, including those of the G-8:  Joint Science Academies’ Statement: 
Climate Change Adaptation and the Transition to a Low Carbon Society (June 2008), 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes /climatechangestatement.pdf. 
8. Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/ science/earth/01climate.html; 
Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism:  Finding a Path to 
Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector. 32 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 615, 619 (2004); 
RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:  PREVENTION DUTIES
AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2005); M.J. Mace, Adaptation Under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change:  The Legal Framework (Sept. 2003) (presented at 
‘Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change,’ at the Zuckerman Institute for Connective 
Environmental Research University of East Anglia), http://www.field.org.uk/ 
files/Adaptation-Tyndall%20Paper-MACEAugust%2023-FINAL.pdf; Kenneth M. Chomitz et 
al., At Loggerheads:  Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and Tropical Forests, WORLD
BANK, 2007, at xi, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/ 
IW3P/IB/2006/10/19/000112742_20061019150049/additional/ixviiiPRRALFMweb.pdf; 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008:
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE:  HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 8 (2007), [hereinafter 
UNDP] (Their 2007 HDR is primarily dedicated to the links between (un)sustainable 
development and (un)mitigated global climate change). 
9. One of the earliest authors writing for a general audience to presage global
climate change’s ravages was BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989).  McKibben 
argued that weather phenomena were no longer “natural” because humans were 
changing the very climate system that had previously been beyond our means to 
impact. 
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By ecological resiliency, I mean protecting and preserving the natural 
ecosystems that help human communities survive through buffering from 
floods, filtering drinking water, stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest 
products, and preserving a host of other ecosystem services necessary for 
human survival. (I am not referring to preserving functioning ecosystems 
and their myriad component species for their own sake; while this is, to me, 
ethical and desirable, and is the subject of other multilateral environment 
agreements (MEAs) (e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands),10 it is by and large not the focus of the legal 
climate regime.) By social resiliency, I mean forging the democratic capacity 
to help marginalized communities accrue the administrative, technical, and 
political power that will help them make difficult decisions and survive the 
coming vicissitudes of nature and the coming economic and political 
upheavals (some of which are the subject of this paper) that are now 
befalling and will continue to befall them.11 
The Global Climate Change Treaty Regime 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”) set goals for the world’s nations to reduce their greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions in order to mitigate global climate change.12  The 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into effect in 2005, spelled out the terms that 
legally bind signatory nations.13  “Annex 1” nations – nations of the “North” – 
have been primarily responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) build-up, and 
their economic development has allowed them the financial and technical 
10. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml; Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, 
Ramsar, Iran, 2 Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www. ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm. 
11. WORLD BANK, BIO CARBON FUND 9-10 (2007), available at; Ramsar Convention
on Wetlands, Ramsar, Iran, 2 Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www.ramsar.org/ 
key_conv_e.htm.http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID
=970; C. Bracer, S. Scherr, A. Molnar, M. Sekher, B.O. Ochieng, & G. Sriskanthan, 
Organization and Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmental Services: 
CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4 at 35 (ICRAF Working Paper no. 39, World 
Agroforestry Centre, 2007); Brian Walsh, Getting Credit for Saving Trees, TIME July 12, 
2007; Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah, CDM Participation and Credit Pricing in Africa in EQUAL
EXCHANGE:  DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE FOR CARBON 133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel, 
eds., 2007) available at http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/Perspectives/ 
FairPriceCarbon.pdf; KATOOMBA GROUP, GETTING STARTED:  AN INTRODUCTORY PRIMER TO
ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICE DEALS 17 (2007), available at 
http://www.katoombagroup.org/ documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf. 
12. UNFCC, supra note 1.
13. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2.
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means to mitigate this pollution.14  This notion of “common but 
differentiated responsibility” (CBDR), which I will explain further below, is 
the guiding principle for the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.  Under the rubric of 
CBDR, Northern nations pledged themselves to various degrees of 
emissions reduction, aiming to reduce GHGs by at least 5 percent below 
1990 levels, as measured during the commitment period of 2008-2012.15  All 
Northern nations except the U.S. have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.16  By the 
Kyoto Protocol’s terms, Southern nations have no binding GHG reduction 
targets, but nonetheless under CBDR have joint obligations to work towards 
curbing climate change.17 
Customary Norms of International Environmental Law 
I argue here that Northern nations are legally obligated to provide 
adaptation aid to Southern nations that helps communities become more 
socially and ecologically resilient when faced with global climate change. 
Even if they are not currently legally obliged to do so, I believe private actors 
investing in FCOs ought to follow those same legal strictures as anyone 
providing adaptation aid.  International law should stipulate that any FCOs 
that result in a net transfer of wealth from South to North, or that disinvest 
poor people of their means of subsistence, are illegal. 
While international environmental law usually focuses on the 
obligations of nation-actors, many scholars and activists argue that these 
same norms should also apply to non-state actors, including multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), and international financial institutions (IFIs).  An 
exhaustive review of this literature is not possible here.  Professor Peter 
Muchlinski notes, “[a]t present there are no detailed international rules, or 
procedures, for the environmental regulation of MNEs.”18  He characterizes 
as “weak” the evidence that corporate social actors are liable in domestic 
courts for violations of principles of customary international environmental 
14. Anita M. Halvorrsen, Common But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate
Change Regime:  Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 
18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247, 254-55 (2007). 
15. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change
Compliance:  Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVT’L L.J. 44, 46 (2008). 
16. The newly elected Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, signed the Kyoto
Protocol as his first act of office on December 3, 2007, leaving the United States alone 
among the Northern nations in failing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  Reuters, Australian 
Leader Ratifies Kyoto Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007. 
17. Kevin Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate
Change Regime:  Lessons for the Future, 38 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 365, 381 (2006). 
18. Peter T. Muchlinski, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 566 (2007).
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law.19  Steven R. Ratner describes the “doctrinal straitjacket” that prioritizes 
state responsibility and duties in international environmental law.20  Private 
actors may pollute, or, as is the case in FCOs, foment environmental change 
across national boundaries.  Muchlinski argues that private actors should be 
controlled by both home and host country when acting as CDM project 
developers, and when acting under the CDM, I believe private actors should 
be bound by the legal norms encoded within the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.21  
But while international human rights law requires the home states of these 
companies to regulate them from committing human rights violations under 
the auspices of the voluntary market, they have little incentive to do so and 
face little prospect of sanctions for their failure.22  Host states, particularly in 
the South, may lack the expertise, capacity, and power to regulate, and may 
be willing to accept whatever Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is proffered, 
particularly if powerful elites in the host country are benefiting.23  Thus, 
Ratner criticizes the “anachronistic” emphasis on state responsibility in the 
age of nimble, protean multinational enterprises.24 
Even if private actors are not currently legally bound by international 
environmental legal norms, or do not consider themselves legally bound by 
them, the norms are available for adoption as ethical principles and “best 
practices” that I believe private actors ought to follow.  To the extent that 
international environmental law does not regulate private actors investing in 
FCOs, the international legal system ought to be reformed so that private 
actors do have clear legal responsibilities to foment genuine adaptation 
within the guiding framework of principles of customary international 
environmental law, and legal principles encoded in the UNFCCC/Kyoto 
Protocol and its prospective successor. 
When considering customary international environmental law, one 
must be careful of the “myth system,” i.e., principles that represent the 
19. Id. at 572.
20. Steven R. Ratner, Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 5, at 807, 808, 811. 
21. Muchlinski, supra note 18, at 571.
22. Ratner, supra note 20, at 809.
23. Id. at 810; BRACER ET AL., supra note 11, at 35; Charlotte Streck, Lucio Pedoni,
Manuel Estrada Porrua, & Michael Dutschke, Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further 
Deforestation:  The Nested Approach in CHARLOTTE STRECK, ROBERT O’SULLIVAN, TOBY 
JANSON-SMITH, & RICHAD TAROSOFSKY, eds., CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS; 
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 240-41 (London, 2008); DAVID
HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM:  DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 207 (2006); 
Tom Griffiths, Seeing ‘Red’? ‘Avoided Deforestation’ and the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities, Forest Peoples Programme, at 5, 13, 14 (June 2007), 
http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/avoided_deforestation _red_jun07_eng.pdf. 
24. Ratner, supra note 20, at 816.
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cherished norms of international environmental lawyers and activists, but 
don’t reflect actual state practice.25  With that proviso, legal scholars see a 
number of principles of environmental law as emerging customary 
international law, finding their way into international and regional 
conventions, national constitutions, and international and domestic legal 
opinions.26  Several of these codify principles of equity where international 
environmental law coincides with international human rights law, where 
commitment to the environment dovetails with commitment to social 
justice.  At very least, these principles provide a guiding framework for a 
robust system of international environmental legal principles that ought to 
guide FCOs and ought to bind all actors (state and private) who develop and 
monitor FCO projects. 
Preventative Principle 
The arbitration panel for the famous 1937 Trail Smelter case named the 
preventative principle: “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”27  
This is both about damage to territory, and the health of “persons” living in 
that neighboring territory.  The preventative principle has become a 
cornerstone of customary international environmental law, as embodied by 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, requiring a kind of due 
diligence, or state “responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”28  The UNFCCC’s 
Preamble reifies Principle 21, emphasizing that while States have “the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies,” they nonetheless must refrain 
from causing “damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
25. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 116 (1995). 
26. For a good review, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Customary Law and General
Principles, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 5, 
at 449, 453.  Dupuy states that “customary international environmental law is both 
omnipresent and of paramount importance.” 
27. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Trail Smelter
Arb. Trib. 1938 & 1941). 
28. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (June 5-16, 1972), Principle 21, available at http://www.unep.org/ 
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503. 
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the limits of national jurisdiction.29  In the context of climate change, this is an 
equity argument for mitigation; i.e., polluters should emphasize preventing 
GHG emissions.  It is also an argument that FCOs fomenting adaptation 
across boundaries should not damage the host country’s environment. 
Polluter Pays Principle 
As Northern nations continue to emit vast quantities of GHGs, they 
violate the preventative principle, and thus the polluter pays principle steps in 
as backstop.  The Rio Declaration’s Principle 16 prescribes: “National 
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach 
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution.”30  Taken in 
conjunction with CBDR (see below), this is a moral and legal presumption 
that those whose pollution is causing global climate change should also be 
mitigating GHG emissions and helping others adapt to the pollution’s 
negative toll.31  Sunstein describes such GHG pollution as a kind of tort, 
where polluters who have gained economically from their pollution ought to 
pay for the damage they have caused.32 The polluter pays principle is the 
most robust example of duties that apply to transnational corporations, 
found in numerous multilateral environmental agreements that direct legal 
responsibility on corporations for transboundary pollution they create.33  To 
the extent that FCOs constitute appropriate “payment” for past GHG 
pollution, they fulfill a customary international environmental legal 
obligation that the polluter should pay for its acts.  But FCOs that 
compensate the project developer, rather than the communities harmed by 
climate change, violate this legal precept. 
Environmental Democracy 
Environmental democracy is an emerging norm at the intersection of 
environmental and human rights law.34  Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
29. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Preamble.
30. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (June 3-14, 1992), available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID
=1163 [hereinafter Rio]. 
31. UNDP, supra note 8, at 41.
32. Cass Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto:  A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 54 (2007).
33. Ratner, supra note 20, at 813.
34. SUMUDU A. ATAPATTU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 289 (2006). 
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encourages access to pertinent information for citizens affected by 
environmental decisions, the right to participate in decision making 
processes, and the right to access all judicial and administrative 
proceedings including redress and remedy.35  The October 2007 U.N. “[n]on-
legally binding instrument on all types of forests” declares that “local 
communities, forest owners and other relevant stakeholders contribute to 
achieving sustainable forest management and should be involved in a 
transparent and participatory way in forest decision-making processes that 
affect them, as well as in implementing sustainable forest management, in 
accordance with national legislation.”36  Also under this aegis fits the 
requirement of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) with full public 
input and participation,37 and a general right of access to just governance. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Aarhus 
Convention is at the forefront of attempts to codify and implement these 
principles of environmental democracy, but they are finding their way into 
other multinational environment agreements (MEAs) and into national 
constitutions or statutes.38  Citizens – particularly those who are likely to be 
affected by an FCO – should be able to review and comment before any 
trading scheme is implemented, and should be able to prevent unjust 
trading schemes.  In fact, in an ideal environmental democracy, these offsets 
should be proposed by community members whose forests are to become 
marketable carbon reservoirs. 
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) 
Northern nations are legally obliged to fund mitigation and adaptation 
strategies in the South that will help avoid human rights and ecological 
cataclysms that result from the North’s responsibility for creating climate 
change.  The legal obligations come first from CBDR’s status as an emerging 
principle of customary international environmental law.39  But CBDR is also 
the explicit legal foundation of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, as named in 
Article 3 of the UNFCCC: 
35. Rio, supra note 30, Principle 10.
36. U.N. Forum on Forests, Oct. 17, 2007, Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All
Types of Forests, U.N. Document A/C.2/62/L.5 (Oct. 22, 2007). 
37. Rio supra note 30, Principle 17; Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in
International Environmental Law:  Policies, Principles, and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 425, supra note 5, at 439. 
38. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Europe, Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, U.N. 
Document. ECE/CEP/43 (June 25, 1998), available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ 
documents/cep43e.pdf. 
39. Halvorrsen, supra note 15, at 254.
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The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.  Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof.40 
This principle of CBDR appears throughout the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol.41  CBDR has been called the “ethical anchor” of the Kyoto Protocol. 
One could also call it the legal anchor.42  Because Northern nations have 
created and continue to create disproportionate GHG pollution (e.g., the 19 
million residents of New York State produce more GHGs than the 766 
million people living in the 50 least-developed countries;43 the U.S. currently 
produces about 19 percent of GHGs44 and has emitted 30 percent of GHGs 
between 1850-200045) and disproportionately profit from it, and because 
Southern nations will disproportionately suffer from climate change’s 
ravages, the North has the legal responsibility – and the financial and 
technological means – to mitigate the problem.46 
FCO projects that respect CBDR and genuinely mitigate Northern 
emissions while helping the South adapt to global climate change would 
help fulfill this obligation; but any such projects that allow the North to 
evade legal responsibility to reduce their own emissions, and that further 
undercut the South’s ability to adopt, violate the equity-enhancing 
underpinnings of CBDR.  Southern nations also have CBDR obligations 
under the climate treaties, i.e., while they have no binding emissions 
reduction targets, they must still work to mitigate climate change.  For 
example, they must establish a Designated National Authority (DNA) who 
40. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art. 3.
41. Id., Preamble; Art. 4, para. 1; Art 4, para 4(1)(e); Art 4, para. 3; Art 4(7);
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 10; Art 10(c). 
42. Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the
Climate Regime, 16 YB IEL 81, 86 (2007). 
43. UNDP, supra note 8, at 43.
44. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/ facts-
and-figures/international/annual-emissions. 
45. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/ facts-
and-figures/international/cumulative. 
46. Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in
the Forestry Sector:  Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV., 98, 102 
(1997); Halvorssen, supra note 15, at 254. 
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will assist CDM project developers and will approve or reject proposed CDM 
projects.47 
As noted above, principles of international environmental law tend to 
apply to nation states, but not private actors.  Whether or not private actors 
working to develop CDM FCOs under the Kyoto Protocol are bound by the 
legal principles that undergird the treaty remains unclear.  When the climate 
conventions discuss CBDR, it is in the context of “Parties,” and these Parties 
are nation-states.  For example, the Preamble to the UNFCCC “calls for the 
widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an 
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and 
their social and economic conditions . . . .”48 
One could argue that where the treaties do not specify that Parties are 
states, they are referring more generally to a broader array of actors with 
legal duties.  But the UNFCCC always refers to “Parties” in a context where 
the clearest legal reading is to States as parties.  While the UNFCCC does 
not define “Party,” the Kyoto Protocol does: “‘Party’ means, unless the 
context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.”49  Article 12.9 of the 
Kyoto Protocol permits “[p]articipation under the clean development 
mechanism, including in activities mentioned in paragraph 3(a)50 above and 
in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve private 
and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be 
provided by the Executive Board (EB) of the clean development 
mechanism.”51  Thus private entities participate in CDM project development 
(and indeed are the primary proponents of these projects), but it remains 
unclear whether they are “Parties” who are legally required to operate within 
the CBDR framework that guides State actors. 
 Absent clear guidance from the EB or the Conference of the Parties 
(COP), a narrow reading of the legal obligations of CBDR seems appropriate. 
International law depends on the nation state as duty bearer and 
prosecutor.52  And in FCOs, nation states are in violation of the various 
principles, including the explicitly codified CBDR.  Northern nation states 
are seldom the direct investors in FCOs, either under the CDM or voluntarily 
47. Karen Capoor & Philippe Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006:
Focus on Africa, WORLD BANK, 2006, at 24, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/ 
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/02/26/000090341_20070226114316/Render
ed/PDF/386180AFR0Carb1s1on1Africa01PUBLIC1.pdf. 
48. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Preamble.
49. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 1.6.
50. Id., Paragraph 3(a) of Art. 12:  “Parties not included in Annex I will benefit
from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions.” 
51. Id., Art 12.9.
52. Ratner, supra note 23, at 807, 808, 811, 816.
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(although Norway is planning to invest over a half-billion U.S. dollars per 
year in these projects in a drive to become “carbon neutral”53).  But Northern 
nations are failing to take significant steps to help Southern nations adapt, 
either as part of the formal climate change legal regime or otherwise.  And 
they are failing to police their private actors who are profiting handsomely 
from FCOs, whether or not these projects do anything to help Southern 
communities adapt to GCC.  Southern nations are not exempt from CBDR 
responsibilities; at very least, under the CDM, their DNAs should refuse to 
permit FCOs that do not help – and may hurt – local communities,54 or are 
questionable ecologically (e.g., using non-native species like eucalyptus55).  
But what power or incentives do cash-strapped Southern nations really have 
against powerful Northern capitalists (or their own elites who may be 
profiting) who see in their forests new sources of profit, and who are 
spinning carbon into gold? 
The Clean Development Mechanism 
Northern nations can escape real reductions to emissions through a 
variety of “flexibility mechanisms.”  They can trade emissions credits 
amongst themselves,56 or invest in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects in the South.57  The CDM hypothetically allows Northern nations to 
transfer clean technology and wealth to Southern nations to help the latter 
develop sustainably and cleanly, while allowing Northern nations to offset 
53. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Lofty Pledge to Cut Emissions Comes With Caveat in Norway,
N.Y. TIMES, March 22 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/world/europe/ 
22norway.html?scp=1&sq=Rosenthal+Norway&st=nyt. 
54. Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 24; Johannes Ebeling, Risks and
Criticisms of Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading in, Streck et al. 
eds., supra note 23, at 54. 
55. Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading:  A Critical Conversation on Climate Change,
Privatization and Power, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD CENTRE DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE NO. 48, Sept. 
2006, at 227, 238, 240, 267, 306, http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2006_48_carbon_ 
trading/carbon_trading_web_HQ.pdf.  Non-natives, including Eucalyptus, are to be 
planted as part of both the Chinese and Tanzanian case studies I discuss here; See 
Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin:  Project Design 
Document, July 21, 2006 at 2, 13, 24, http://cdm.unfccc.int/User Management 
/FileStorage/7Y41M57708ZDR95GDFS8LGOZLPC7ZL [hereinafter PDD Guangxi]; 
Afforestation in grassland areas of Uchindile, Kilombero, Tanzania & Mapanda, Mufindi, Tanzania: 
Project Design Document, July 26, 2007, at 4, 5, 15, http://www.netinform.net/ 
KE/files/pdf/PDD_GRL_version_26July_rev3.pdf [hereinafter PDD Uchindile]. 
56. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 17; Halvorrsen, supra note 30 at 257.
57. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, Art. 6.
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their emissions requirements in an inexpensive way.58  The UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol repeatedly refer to the primary interest of Southern nations 
in the “sustainable development” aspects of the climate treaty regime.59 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore just what “sustainable 
development” means in this context,60 FCOs under the CDM should at least 
be furthering the social development needs of local populations and 
contributing to intragenerational and intergenerational equity while 
preserving the natural environment on which that development depends.61 
The Conference of Parties (“COP”) to the climate accords have 
specified that flexibility mechanisms, including the CDM, are meant to be 
“supplemental” to the real domestic reductions in GHG; such domestic 
actions are meant to comprise a “significant element” in GHG emissions 
required by the Kyoto Protocol.62  What constitutes “supplemental” or 
“significant” is not specified. 
While the CDM was meant to benefit a wide range of Southern nations, 
more than 80 percent of CDM projects have been directed towards China, 
India, Mexico and Brazil.63  China has generated about 50 percent of the 
projects representing 60 percent of the volume of emissions reduction 
credits between 2002 and 2006 within the CDM.64 China’s advanced 
infrastructure is well equipped to undertake the bureaucratic and technical 
requirements of the CDM, and private actors are eager to gain footholds in 
lucrative Chinese markets.65 
The CDM bears little resemblance to its original concept as proposed 
by Brazil when the Kyoto Protocol was being negotiated.  Supported by the 
58. Rowlands, supra note 5 at 315, 331.
59. UNFCCC, supra note 2, Art. 3.5; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 2.1, Art .10,
Art. 12.2. 
60. See Daniel Barstow Magraw & Lisa D. Hawke, Sustainable Development, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 614, supra note 5, at 618. 
Aside from its explicit references in the climate change treaties, “sustainable 
development” is an emerging customary norm of international environmental law. 
61. Id., at 619-620; EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTER-GENERATIONAL EQUITY 3 (1989); Non-
legally binding instrument, supra note 36, at 104; ATAPATTU, supra note 35, at 78.  
62. UNFCCC, Report on the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session,
Held at Marrakesh From 29 October to 10 November 2001, Principles, nature and scope of 
the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 15/CP.7, ¶ 8 
(Sept. 11, 2001). 
63. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP] Risoe Centre, CDM projects by host region (Oct. 1,
2008), http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm. 
64. Id.
65. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 15, at 53.
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G-77 nations and China, Brazil had proposed a mechanism that would
forecast Northern emissions for the treaty’s commitment period.  Countries
that failed to meet their emissions targets would face a “compulsory
contribution” – i.e., a fine – of US$10 for every one ton over their ceiling,
which would go to funding climate change mitigation and adaptation
projects in the South.  Thus, the fund was envisioned as a “stick” that would
compel the North to meet its commitments and would fund “clean
development” in the South if the North failed.66
Led by the U.S. during Kyoto negotiations, Northern nations instead 
turned the CDM into a mechanism to provide climate-friendly and profit-
generating investment in the South in exchange for the carbon saved to 
offset the required reductions proposed by the treaty.  In other words, rather 
than a fine that compels compliance, the CDM became a means for the 
North – and particularly its businesses – to avoid meeting targeted, required 
GHG reductions.67  Unlike most other MEAs, private actors may also 
participate in generating projects under the CDM by developing, financing, 
and supervising projects under the CDM.68  Private actors can use CDM 
projects to offset requirements that may have been imposed on them by 
their governments, or they can profit financially by selling or trading credits 
to other actors (private or governmental) who must meet emissions 
reduction targets.  Much, if not most of the U.N.-sponsored effort in the past 
ten years around climate change has gone into making a functional CDM, 
much to the benefit of business interests around the world. Private actors 
generated $US30 billion per year worth of CDM projects in 2006, the first 
year after the Kyoto Protocol went into effect.69  As we shall see here, private 
actors have further undermined Brazil’s original proposal, as they have 
found multifarious ways to profit from the mechanism while evading real 
reductions in GHG emissions. 
Current Adaptation Efforts 
The UNFCCC’s Article 2 prioritizes stabilizing GHG concentrations “to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
66. Jacob Werksman, The Clean Development Mechanism:  Unwrapping the ‘Kyoto
Surprise.’ 7(2) REV. EURO. COMMM & INTN’L ENVTL. L. 147, 151 (1998). 
67. Id. at 152.
68. Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, Technical and Financial Assistance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 947, supra note 5, at 969. 
69. UNFCCC, The Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol:  Emissions Trading,
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, http://unfccc.int/ 
kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
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proceed in a sustainable manner.”70  Article 4.4 specifies that the “developed 
country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also 
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects.”71  Article 4.8 names the specific adaptation needs of, inter 
alia, island nations, nations with low-lying coastal areas, nations with areas 
liable to drought, forest decay, natural disasters and fragile ecosystems.72  
The Kyoto Protocol requires that part of CDM funds be used “to assist 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.”73  This was later 
set as a kind of tax of 2 percent of all certified emissions reductions (CERs) 
generated by CDM projects.74  The Adaptation Fund of the CDM, operated by 
the Global Environment Facility,75 is expected to bring in $US80 million to 
$US300 million ayear between now and 2012.76 
The money is much needed.  Action on adaptation under the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol has been slow,77 and plans to implement 
adaptation aid have lagged behind other programs – and, in particular, have 
lagged behind efforts to implement the CDM, a flexibility mechanism 
Northern nations have been keen on developing for reasons I elaborate in 
this article.  Eleven years after the Kyoto Protocol was established, and three 
70. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 2.
71. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 4.4. Art 4.9 reiterates that “The Parties shall take
full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed 
countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology.” 
72. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 4.9.
73. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 12.8.
74. UNFCCC, Cooperation & Support, Financial Mechanism, Adaptation Fund,
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/3659.php (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
75. UNFCCC, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate
change by enhancing implementation of the Convention, Report on the analysis of existing 
and potential investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an effective and 
appropriate international response to climate change, Fourth workshop, Vienna, August 27–31, 




77. The Bali Action Plan calls for enhanced action on adaptation, including all
the basic steps one would have expected to have occurred long ago.  UNFCCC, 
Decision-/CP 13, Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), http://unfccc.int/ 
files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf. 
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years after it has gone into effect, little progress has been made on 
guidelines for appropriate use of the Adaptation Fund.78 
Progress on adaptation has also been slow outside the auspices of the 
formal climate change treaty regime.  Contrary to the requirements of CBDR, 
Northern nations have spent only about $US40 million a year in voluntary aid to 
help Southern nations adapt; northern nations have spent about $US40 billion a 
year helping themselves adapt.79  Kevin Watkins, of the United Nations Human 
Development Report Office, notes that this “borders on the derisory,”80 and 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has called this “climate change apartheid.”81 
Forest Carbon Offsets (FCOs) 
Half of the global terrestrial carbon pool is stored in forests.82  Tropical 
deforestation accounts for 11 percent to 28 percent of GHG emissions.83  Africa 
alone is losing nearly 10 million acres of forest each year.84  The UNDP reports 
that continued deforestation from Indonesia and Brazil alone equals 80 
percent of the GHG emissions savings achieved if all Annex 1 nations were to 
meet their Kyoto Protocol goals in the 2008-2012 commitment period.85 
Northern investment in Southern forest preservation and reforestation 
is rapidly gaining currency both as one scheme to mitigate GHG buildup, 
and to help some communities and nations adapt to the ravages of global 
climate change.86  In an FCO, a project developer plants trees to reforest a 
degraded ecosystem, or ensures that a forest that would have otherwise 
78. Id.
79. Revkin, Poor, supra note 8.
80. Id.
81. UNDP, supra note 8, at 166.
82. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Reducing
Emissions From Deforestation:  a Key Opportunity for Attaining Multiple Benefits (Feb. 23, 
2007), at 4, available at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/resources/publications/unep_ 
wcmc%20RED%20Feb07.pdf. 
83. Id., at 4 cites 18 percent to 25 percent; Figure of 11 percent to 28 percent
from UNDP, supra note 8, at 41.  UNDP also notes that transportation and power 
generation in the North are bigger contributors to GCC than tropical deforestation. 
84. LeMonde, L’Afrique perd plus de 4 millions d’hectares de forêt chaque année, selon
l’ONU, LEMONDE, June 10, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/sciences-et-environnement/ 
portfolio/2008/06/10/deforestation-inquietante-en-afrique_ 1056434_3244.html. 
85. Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel Nepstad,
Lisa Curran, & Carlos Nobre, Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol:  a new proposal, 
submitted to COP-9, Dec. 1-12, 2003, at 2. 
86. E.g., World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Bio Carbon Fund, http://
carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708. 
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been degraded or felled is, instead, preserved.  The developer can then sell 
the carbon, in the form of CERs now sequestered in the trees and soil, for a 
contracted period of time.  Proponents of FCOs argue that these projects 
will mitigate GHG accumulation globally, preserve vital ecosystems that 
help buffer the effects of global climate change and help sustain ecosystem 
services communities require locally, and also preserve biodiversity and 
generate ecologically sustainable new forms of wealth to community 
members living near forested lands.87  Preserving forests helps to stabilize 
local climate fluctuations, prevent drought, protect aquifers, maintain 
pollinator populations, stabilize soil, buffer communities from natural 
disasters, allow a source of sustainable forest products, and preserve forest-
related options for the future.88 
FCOs were a prominent topic at the December 2007 COP to the 
UNFCCC in Bali,89 and will likely be expanded as part of the CDM or similar 
mechanism in the post-2012 successor to the Kyoto Protocol.90  Outside the 
ambit of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, voluntary markets in carbon offsets 
are booming, with an array of businesses helping other businesses, 
individuals, and municipalities to offset their carbon footprints.91 
Current Kyoto Protocol rules allow only 1 percent of carbon credits 
under the CDM to be allotted for projects in Land Use, Land-Use Change 
and Forestry (LULUCF).92  Projects that prevent deforestation are currently 
excluded from CDM eligibility, but it is expected they will be a part of the 
87. Santilli et al., supra note 85, at 5; Imke Sagemüller Forest Sinks Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol:  Opportunity or 
Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 191 (2006); UNEP World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 12; Nelson, supra note 8, at 615, 622. 
88. UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 9-10; Stefano
Pagiola, Natasha Landell-Mills, & Joshua Bishop, Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for 
Forests and People in STEFANO PAGIOLA, JOSHUA BISHOPP, & NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS, SELLING 
FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES:  MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 224 (London, 2002). Certified Emission Reductions Sale and Purchase 
Agreement (CERSPA), Guidance Document Version 1.0, Apr. 2007, www.cerspa.org; David 
Freestone, Foreword in Streck et al., supra note 23, at xii.]] 
89. Andrew C. Revkin, Delegates in Bali for Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 2, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/science/earth/02cnd-bali.html?ex= 
1197262800&en=cb0edc2c0fce1ee7&ei=5070&emc=eta1; Peter Gelling, Forest Loss in 
Sumatra Becomes a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06indo.html?hp. 
90. Id.
91. Int’l Inst. for Env. Dev. [IIED] & World Wildlife Fund [WWF], Climate, Carbon,
Conservation and Communities: An IIED/WWF Briefing 2 (2007), available at http://www. 
iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/17011IIED.pdf. 
92. Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 23; Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.
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successor to the Kyoto Protocol.93  However, reforestation projects are 
currently permitted.94  Only one such project has thus far been registered, 
which I will use as a case study.95  Others are in development or await 
approval.96 
Many Kyoto Protocol signatories were skeptical about these projects, 
and therefore circumscribed their inclusion as CDM-eligible.97  Skeptics 
claim that FCOs have problems with leakage (communities that formerly 
relied upon a forest are likely to cut trees elsewhere;98 a government may 
preserve one forest from planned logging and instead offer timber 
concessions elsewhere; logging companies denied concession rights in one 
country may instead cut timber in a neighboring country);99 permanence 
(forests burn or get chopped down);100 quantifiability (FCOs pose technical 
challenges of calculating present and future carbon stored in forests, 
particularly under different climate change scenarios);101 and additionality 
(project developers must show the project would not have been undertaken 
but for the FCO).  When such additionality is false – as it has been shown to 
be in as many as 20 percent of CDM projects102 – they result in a net increase 
in GHG emissions.103  Thus FCOs do not mitigate climate change, and may 
well increase GHG emissions.104 
93. UNEP, supra note 6.
94. Id.
95. IIED & WWF, supra note 91, at 2-3.
96. Bruno Locatelli, Lucio Pedroni, & Zenia Salinas, ‘Design Issues in Clean
Development Mechanism Forestry Projects’ in Streck et al., supra note 23 at 108. 
97. Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.
98. Id., at 196; Nelson, supra note 8, at 645; Ebeling, supra note 55, at 50; Cullet
& Kameri-Mbote, supra note 47, at 98. 
99. Ebeling, supra note 55, at 51; Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 47, at 111;
WORLD BANK CARBON FINANCE UNIT, FOREST CONCEPT PARTNERSHIP FACILITY [FCPF] CONCEPT
NOTE 4 (2007), available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/FCPF_Concept_Note_ 
FINAL.pdf; Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets:  Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through 
Emissions Trading 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 291, 296 (2004). 
100. PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 124 (2007); Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 195; UNEP World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 4-5; Ebeling, supra note 55, at 47. 
101. Walsh, supra note 11; Baumert, supra note 17, at 396; Cullet & Kameri-
Mbote, supra note 47, at 99. 
102. Revkin, Poor, supra note 8.
103. Marisa Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projects for the
Voluntary Carbon Market:  A Practical Analysis in Streck et al., eds., supra note 23, at 317; 
Lohmann, supra note 55, at 145; Sebastian M. Scholz & Martina Jung, Forestry Projects 
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But Southern nations have a strong incentive (i.e., cash and 
technology transfer) to assert that projects were not planned, even if they 
were; and Northern countries have strong incentive to fund these projects, 
which are often a inexpensive way of buying the right to pollute more at 
home and to please domestic private investors.105  Furthermore, opponents 
of these projects argue that few financial benefits of such schemes are likely 
to reach those who live in and around forests, and in fact may be captured 
by national governments or corrupt, elite, local and national figures.106  They 
worry that local communities will lose the livelihoods they derive from 
forests.107  However, multiple forces are pushing for expansion of CDM 
forestry projects, and preparatory workshops and conferences have taken 
place to prepare the ground for this expansion in the successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol.108 
Why FCOs are such a big deal now and a bigger deal in future 
Some experts forecast that the carbon industry will grow to as much as 
$US1trillion a year within a decade, possibly becoming the world’s leading 
commodity market.109  A multitude of businesses take part in the financial 
action.  Some seek inexpensive ways to offset government-required 
emissions reductions; some turn those required reductions into profit 
making as they reduce emissions more than required and are able to sell the 
remaining credits.  The forests of the global South offer an alluring financial 
and ecological sink: If you can pay poor governments and/or poor people to 
reforest or not deforest, and you can get credit for the resulting saved carbon 
credit that you can use to offset your emissions, you can both sell your 
emissions reduction credits, and continue business as usual in the North. 
London is the global capital of an industry where asset managers broker 
under the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation:  Rules and Regulations in Streck 
et al., eds., supra note 23,  at 76-77. 
104. Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.
105. Nelson, supra note 8, at 645.
106. Griffiths, supra note 23, at 5.
107. Id.
108. E.g. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice, Twenty-sixth session, May 7-18, 2007, Report on 
the second workshop on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, ¶44, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3 (Apr. 17, 2007); Gelling, supra note 89. 
109. James Kanter, In London’s Financial World, Carbon Trading is the Next Big Thing,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/business/worldbusiness/ 
06carbon.html. 
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these deals and guide other businesses through the tortuous ins and outs of 
the emerging carbon market.110 
While the CDM has circumscribed their eligibility, FCOs are thriving as 
part of the broader voluntary carbon offset market.  As of 2006, more than 30 
companies were selling carbon offsets to individuals and companies wishing 
to offset their carbon footprints.111  In 2006, the voluntary market for carbon 
offsets brought in US$110 million.112  That figure is expected to grow to 
US$40 billion by 2010.113  Merrill Lynch has just become the first Wall Street 
firm to invest big time in FCOs, spending $US9 million to preserve a 1.9 
million-acre forest in Sumatra.114  Outside the bounds of formal regulation, a 
host of MNEs, NGOs, and IFIs are investing in these FCOs, with potential to 
wield powerful influence on how human and ecological communities are 
configured in distant lands.  They are deriving their own codes of conduct for 
how they will proceed.  I shall trace the various actors who stand to profit 
and lose from this voluntary FCO market, and shall explain the implications 
of this market for mitigating global climate change and for regulating (or 
not) how MNEs respond to the crisis of global climate change. 
Case Studies 
Introduction 
In China, the Guangxi Watershed Management FCO employs rural 
villagers to reforest nearly 10,000 acres of degraded land.115  Guangxi is the 
first land use project approved by the CDM.  The project is small, but is seen 
as a “testing ground” where participants are “learning by doing.”116  
Specifically, project investors are testing the technical challenges to 
achieving “credible carbon sequestration” while “pilot[ing] the viability of 
enhancing the livelihoods of people and natural environment.”117  The 
plantations are described in the Project Design Document (PDD) as a 
110. Id.
111. TREXLER CLIMATE & ENERGY SERVICES, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO RETAIL CARBON
OFFSET PROVIDERS at iii (2006), http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuide 
toCarbonOffsets.pdf. 
112. Stephen Faris, The Other Side of Carbon Trading, FORTUNE, Aug. 30, 2007.
113. Id.
114. Marc Gunther, Merrill Lynch’s Carbon Bet, MONEY, April 18, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/17/technology/carbon_farming.fortune/?postversion=2
008041808 
115. PDD Guangxi, supra note 55, at 21, 72, 77, 101.
116. Id. at 39.
117. Id. at 2.
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“virtual cash crop” for the local people who will profit both from harvesting 
the trees at the end of the commitment period and from selling the carbon 
credits.118  The PDD also cites the ecosystem services benefits the project 
provides – preserving not just carbon, but also soil, water, and 
biodiversity.119 
In this project, the actors are: a) a private forestry firm, Guangxi 
Huanjiang Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd., which will 
acquire (and can then sell) the emissions reduction credits of the project; b) 
the World Bank; c) the governments of Spain, Italy, and China; d) the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF); and e) TÜV SÜD, an MNE that verifies CDM 
eligibility. 
In the Tanzanian CDM proposal (which I shall abbreviate “Unchindle” 
or “Tanzania”), project developers seek to reforest about 18,000 hectares of 
currently “degraded” rural land.120  While this scheme is ostensibly about 
storing carbon, mitigating global climate change, re-establishing forests, 
and improving Southern rural livelihoods, it also generates profits for 
numerous private corporations. The MNE actors here are: 1) Green 
Resources, Ltd., a Norwegian/Tanzanian tree products company; 2) 
Industrikraft Midt-Norge, a Norwegian energy company and/or other 
potential carbon purchasers; 3) again, TÜV SÜD, the CDM project verifier; 
and 4) SGS, a global standards and verification firm that advises the project 
developers.  
World Bank 
The Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd. will sell as many as 
500,000 temporary Certified Emissions Reductions (tCERs) per year to the 
World Bank for fifteen years.121  They are “temporary” because they expire in 
15 years, after which the project participants can renegotiate another lease, 
or the Chinese landholders may do what they wish with their trees, including 
cut them down, thus potentially releasing the saved carbon.122  One criticism 
of FCOs is that the carbon savings are not permanent: The credits issued are 
in contracts with terms that expire, and forests have an unfortunate 
118. Id. (in quotes in the original).
119. Id.
120. PDD Uchindile, supra note 55, at 3-4.
121. Letter of Approval for Project of Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi
Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin As a Clean Development Mechanism 
Project by National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic 
of China (May 15, 2006), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/ 
FileStorage/7Y41M57708ZDR95GDFS8LGOZLPC7ZL. 
122. Chrisopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, World Bank experiences in contracting for
emission reductions, 2 ENV. LIABILITY 114, 117 (2007). 
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tendency to burn down even while on contract to accumulate carbon. The 
World Bank is buying the tCERs in order to make the project financially 
viable and buffer Northern investors from investment risk.123 
The World Bank promotes forest carbon offset projects with great 
vigor.124  Through its Prototype Carbon Fund established in 1999, the Bank 
pioneered a system whereby Northern investors – private businesses and 
governments – could offset their carbon emissions through investments in 
various Southern projects.125  The carbon offsets from each Bank venture are 
distributed proportionately to the various entities, which in turn could use 
them to offset carbon reduction requirements.126  That is to say, the Bank 
facilitates continued use of GHG-producing fossil fuels by facilitating the 
purchase of cheap carbon offsets in the developing world.  The Bank’s 
recently developed Carbon Finance Unit continues this work by eliciting 
funds from Northern nations (in the Guangxi project, Spain and Italy) that 
the Bank uses to buy emissions reduction credits in Southern nations.127 
The World Bank has launched a Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) to facilitate FCOs.128  The Bank portrays the schemes as a way to halt 
tropical deforestation, while helping Southern nations to capture their 
“potential share in the multi-billion dollar global carbon market,”129 receive 
appropriate technology130 and alleviate poverty.131  World Bank promotional 
material for their BioCarbon Fund touts the contributions to sustainable 
development, including new sources of employment, new sources of 
revenue from forest products and selling carbon credits, and new technical 
123. Id., 117-18.
124. E.g., Chomitz et al., supra note 8, at 4.
125. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 15, at 53.
126. Id.
127. World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, About World Bank Carbon Finance Unit,
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=About&ItemID=1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
128. Press release, The World Bank, Two New World Bank Carbon Facilities
Will Help Fight Climate Change and Deforestation (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://carbonfinance.org/docs/Two_New_World_Bank_Carbon_Facilities_Will_Help_F
ight_Climate_Change_And_Deforestation.pdf 
129. Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 4.
130. Benoit Bosquet, The BioCarbon Fund:  Using the Global Market to Restore Ecosystems:
New Opportunity for Public-Private Partnerships, Powerpoint Presentation, “Enhancing the 
Benefits to Communities From Extractive Industry Projects,” Int’l Fin. Corp [IFC] Conference 
June 16 2006, available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/commdev.nsf/Content/Enhancing-
Presentations-Session5. 
131. FCPF Concept Note, supra note 99, at 4.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009 
63 
capacity building in forestry.132  The Bank’s supporters cite this work as 
contributing to “its mission of global public service.”133 
This Guangxi project is aimed not just at building local capacity, but 
testing a program of small-scale forestry projects, which will seed the 
ground for a “much larger system of positive incentives and financing flows 
in the future.”134  The FCPF is part of the World Bank’s heavy investment in 
carbon financing; the Bank now manages ten carbon funds worth 
$US2 billion with 16 governments and 64 private companies contributing.135  
The Bank represented both buyers (Northern nations and industrial entities) 
and sellers (Southern governments and communities) of these FCOs.136 
Through the Bank’s participation, wealthy purchasers of carbon credits 
are buffered from investment risk.  The Bank assumes the risk that, for 
example, the CDM’s EB will not approve a project.  Once the project has 
been approved, the seller (i.e., the Southern entity) bears the risk of not 
delivering on the promised carbon.  In an FCO, if they do not plant trees at 
the rate promised or if a forest burns down, then they do not receive the 
payment for the promised sequestered carbon.137  The Northern investors 
have little to lose from these deals, and much to gain as they are allowed to 
continue to pollute.  The Bank’s guarantees to investors “triggered the 
massive inflow of private money into the CDM.”138 
Moreover, the Bank’s clients are bundling profit-making from carbon 
trading with other forest-based or similar investments in Southern 
communities.  A World Bank Report notes that 
[T]he most successful deals were those that went beyond contracting
for carbon and included other relationships, viz. equity, debt,
equipment sales, other commodity sales, etc. . . .  For example, a
London-based carbon company reported in its public filings that it had
purchased an equity share in a sugar company in Ethiopia.  We expect
such types of investment activity to continue and rapidly increase as
132. World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Environmental and Social Benefits in the
BioCarbon Fund (May 15, 2004), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&FID 
=9708&ItemID=9708&ft=DocLib&CatalogID=7031. 
133. Karen DeGouve, Negotiating a Fair Price for CERs, in EQUAL EXCHANGE, supra
note 11 at 123. 
134. World Bank Finance Unit, About Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF),
http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FCPF&FID=34267&ItemID=34267&ft=About 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
135. FCPF Concept Note, supra note 99, at 4-5.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Carr & Rosenbuj (2007), supra note 122, at 118.
138. DeGouve, supra note 133.
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carbon becomes just one of the many assets from which investors seek 
to correctly value and grow.139 
A World Resources Institute Report points out the lack of coherence in 
World Bank climate change policy.  The Bank seldom includes advice on 
global climate change in its Country Assistance Strategies;140 it seldom 
considers climate change impacts in its energy sector lending.141  An NGO’s 
audit of World Bank energy policies found that between 1992 and 2004, 82 
percent of all energy projects financed by the Bank shunted fossil fuels from 
South to North, and that these projects, worth over $US10.7 billion, 
overwhelmingly benefited Northern fossil fuel MNEs, of which Halliburton 
was involved as developer, contractor, or investor in $US2.5 billion worth of 
these projects.142  Whatever laudatory intentions it proclaims, it is difficult to 
see how Bank policies promoting FCOs will fail to offer disproportionate 
benefit the wealthy Northern investors that contribute to its carbon funds, 
or how the Bank will successfully offset more than a fraction of GHG 
emissions that its other projects cause. 
One might be more sanguine about the Bank’s carbon investments if 
they were simultaneously generating adaptation benefits for poor 
communities in the global South.  However, that is not necessarily the case. 
About 7 percent of the Bank’s carbon portfolio lies in the Community 
Development Carbon Fund (“CDCF”).143  According to that Fund’s website, 
“[t]he single overarching factor, which defines this Fund and differentiates it 
from other World Bank carbon funds, is the generation of community 
benefits for the projects it finances.”144  That is to say, this Fund 
“differentiates” from the other nine World Bank Carbon Funds because it 
actually focuses on benefiting local communities where it is investing.  CDCF “projects 
are an opportunity for small communities in poorer countries to obtain 
clean water, improve health conditions, create jobs for women, as much as it 
is an investment in clean technologies that help reduce greenhouse gas 
139. Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 25.
140. Jon Sohn, Smita Nakhooda, & Kevin Baumert, Mainstreaming Climate Change
Considerations at the Multilateral Development Banks, WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF 
5 (July 2005). 
141. Id. at 6
142. Jim Vallette & Steve Kretzmann, The Energy Tug of War:  The Winners and
Losers of World Bank Fossil Fuel Finance.  Institute for Policy Studies Sustainable Energy 
& Economy Network (2004), at 2. 
143. World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, About Community Development
Carbon Fund (CDCF), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm? Page=CDCF&ft=About. 
144. Id.
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emissions and mitigate climate change.”145  The Chinese project – like 93 
percent of all World Bank carbon projects – does not fall under the CDCF’s 
aegis, and thus need not focus on these factors. 
The Governments of Spain, Italy, and Norway 
Spain and Italy are financing the Guangxi deal,146 and Norway is 
allowing new domestic polluting energy generation in exchange for 
promises from a developer to offset its carbon in Tanzania.147  As pilot 
projects, these FCOs offer cheap ways to offset required emissions 
reductions under the Kyoto Protocol and its successors.  Norway has 
recently announced it plans to be “carbon neutral” by 2030, partly through 
investing huge funds in forest projects in developing nations.148  At the same 
time, the nations can help fulfill their commitments to the E.U.’s target that 
member states should be contributing 0.7 percent of GDP to Overseas 
Development Assistance by 2015.149 
Cutting GHG emissions sounds good to eco-minded citizens . . . until 
we face the reality of what that might actually mean to our day-to-day lives 
(e.g., higher taxes and fuel costs, curbs on where we can drive and when, 
product bans).  It is natural that elected officials, once they get the good 
press that comes from being eco-friendly, will subsequently look for ways to 
cushion the blows required GHG emissions may rain on their citizens and 
their own political prospects. 
Furthermore, as we can see in the World Bank’s promotional materials, 
MNEs in Northern nations stand to profit not just through carbon offset 
trading but through associated business ventures.  Northern national 
political leaders may thus be under strong pressure to help their MNEs find 
“low hanging fruit” that allows them to offset required carbon reductions in 
the cheapest way possible while finding new and novel ways to reap other 
profits from the scheme. 
China and the Global Environment Facility 
Southern nations hope to attract Northern state and MNE technology 
and funds through FCOs.  The World Bank’s partner in helping Southern 
nations comply with their obligations under Multilateral Environmental 
145. Id.
146. PDD Guangxi, supra note 55, at 4, 87, 88.
147. Harald Erasker, CO2LONIALISM:  NORWEGIAN TREE PLANTATIONS, CARBON
CREDITS AND LAND CONFLICTS IN UGANDA 5, 21 (NorWatch 2000). 
148. Rosenthal, supra note 53.
149. De Chazournes, supra note 68, at 951.  Of course, Norway is not a member
of the E.U. 
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Agreements (MEAs) is the Global Environment Facility (GEF).  The World 
Bank is trustee of the GEF; it administers the GEF in cooperation with the 
UNDP and U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP).150 
While the World Bank facilitates and funds the FCOs for this CDM 
project, China is also using GEF funding “provided for the overall umbrella 
project” of a nature reserve of which this reforestation effort is apparently a 
small part.151  Those industrial entities who stand to benefit financially from 
these FCOs, and who the World Bank would be helping, include profit-
making timber companies.152  The World Bank notes that “[p]rivate 
enterprises (e.g., logging companies or farms) could be directly involved in 
the programs and measures designed to curb deforestation and 
degradation.”153  NGOs protesting this scheme allege that it is “perverse” that 
the World Bank’s policies that are ostensibly “pro-poor” would reward 
industrial loggers who have traditionally contributed both to ecological 
destruction and local impoverishment.154  The Guangxi validation report 
expresses a concern about “diversion of official development assistance” to 
this project that potentially benefits private interests; i.e., the private 
logging concern that is the project developer.155  The entire response from 
the project proponents, which apparently satisfied the verifiers, is that “[t]he 
GEF fund will support the nature reserve management which is separated 
and outside from this CDM project.”156 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid suspecting that China is leveraging 
GEF and World Bank funds in support of a private timber concession.  The 
Chinese project participant listed on the Project Design and other 
150. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, INSTRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
RESTRUCTURED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACILITY 7 (2004), http://thegef.org/GEF_ 
Instrument3.pdf. 
151. World Bank, Validation of the “Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed
Management in Pearl River Basin” Project in China 15 (Validation Report No. 756176, 
Revision 02, 2006), http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/OS5I9UDXM 
1J84BWHKM36KMYY70638G [hereinafter Validation Report]. 
152. FCPF Concept Note, supra note 99, at 11.
153. Id.
154. Letter from Stuard Wilson, Forest Monitor, Patrick Alley, Global Witness,
Susanne Breikopf, Greenpeace International & Simon Counsell, Rainforest 
Foundation UK, to Benoit Bosquet, Sr. Natural Resources Management Specialist, 
Carbon Finance Unit, World Bank (Sept. 7, 2007), www.bicusa.org/proxy/ 
Document.10542.aspx. 
155. Validation Report, supra note 151, at 15.
156. Id.
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documents is the “Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd,”157 who 
will be employing local villagers to do the forestry work and sharing the 
profits with them.  Note that none of the project documents reveal any more 
about them; China’s Letter of Approval for the CDM project only authorizes 
Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd. to carry out the project.158  
The few hits I received from Google were all in Chinese, making it difficult for 
non-Chinese based NGOs to monitor or comment on how private sources 
are profiting from the FCO. 
FCOs, MNEs, and the Problem of Environmental Democracy 
To date, FCOs, as part of the CDM or the voluntary market, are opaque 
and impenetrable for citizens, NGOs, regulators, or lawyers wishing to 
comment on, improve, or monitor the deals. 
To be validated as a CDM project, public comments must be taken into 
account.159 The Validation Report for the Guangxi project notes that “The 
PDD has been made public by February 16, 2006 until April 1, 2006.  No 
stakeholder comments have been received.”160  If relevant stakeholders are 
local citizens that might be affected by the project, would they know that the 
project was open for comment?  Would they have access to computers? 
Would they have the political freedom to publicly oppose such a project? 
Would they have the slightest concept of what the project was about?  While 
stakeholder comments are incorporated within the PDD,161 it is hard to 
believe that rural people in China (or anywhere) understand carbon banking 
well enough to participate meaningfully in their development.162  
157. Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed Management in Pearl River
Basin:  CDM Project Activity Registration and Validation Report Form, July 25, 2006, at 1, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/L8UGEOV2FSX6D7BMUPUONPP
P6JCYVV. 
158. Letter of Approval for Project of Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi
Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin As a Clean Development Mechanism 
Project by National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic 
of China, May 15, 2006, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/ 
FileStorage/7Y41M57708ZDR95GDFS8LGOZLPC7ZL. 
159. Jason Schwartz, ‘”Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto
May Change Who Controls Biodiversity’ 24 NYU Env. L. J. 421, 470 (2006). 
160. Validation Report, supra note 151, at 28.
161. PDD Guangxi, supra note 55, at 81-84.
162. One director of an NGO seeking to monitor FCOs told me that many rural
people with whom she has spoken believe that these FCOs are a kind of charity; they 
have no understanding of carbon trading, and no understanding that when they sign 
certain documents they might be responsible for monetary losses should the forests 
burn or fail to thrive. 
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NGOs or individual concerned citizens could also make comments, if 
they were aware of these projects existing, and if they could understand the 
Byzantine ways of the CDM.  I have been able to find no proposed FCO 
projects on the CDM’s website, even though several that propose to use the 
Climate, Community, & Biodiversity Alliance’s (CCBA) standards are 
available on the CCBA’s website;163 thus you would have to know that a 
project is using these voluntary standards in order to know where to look to 
find the Project Design Document!  The calculus equations164 of the PDD that 
estimate carbon storage, abstruse terminology, and forests of acronyms all 
add to the opacity. 
As noted above, Environmental Democracy is an emerging 
environmental human rights norm.  As such, citizen watchdog groups should 
be able to ensure that nations are fulfilling their emissions pledges.  The 
public – particularly those who are likely to be affected by a CDM forestry 
scheme – should be able to review and comment before any trading scheme 
is implemented, and should be able to prevent unjust trading schemes.  In 
fact, in an ideal environmental democracy, citizens whose forests are to be 
preserved should propose, manage, and benefit from these offsets.    In fact, 
many current FCOs are imposed on local communities by governments or 
are initiated between private actors and local elites.165  Stakeholder 
participation is often minimal in CDM project verification.166  Even in 
progressive voluntary codes that do develop criteria for environmental 
democracy, such as the CCBA’s, citizens could not necessarily scuttle a 
project, and certainly no standards require that local citizens actually 
propose, manage, and/or own the projects.  Whether under the CDM or the 
voluntary market, citizen participation is expensive, and anything that adds 
cost to the process lowers the profit to be made by Northern project 
developers and traders.167  Under the CDM, no Environmental Impact 
Assessments are required.168  Third parties may challenge CDM projects if 
163. The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance [CCBA], CCB Projects,
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  I 
return to CCBA below. 
164. E.g., PDD Guangxi, supra note 55, at 62.
165. Griffiths, supra note 23, at 5.
166. Id. at 58; Climate Action Network, Public Participation in the CDM and JI:
Climate Action Network (CAN) Recommendations, July 2001, http://www.climatenetwork 
org/climate-change-basics/cop-9docs/CAN-pubpartrec.pdf. 
167. Id.
168. Id. The UNFCCC, supra note 1, asks parties to “employ appropriate
methods, for example, impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, 
with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on 
the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to 
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they suspect, for example, that the projects don’t meet “additionality” 
requirements, assuming they can find any meaningful data about what is 
being offset and whether or not the project would have happened anyway 
without CDM assistance.169  Individual nations, through domestic 
environmental laws, could allow their citizens to weigh in on how emissions 
offsets will work in their nations; but this is not the prevalent scheme in the 
South generally and in current FCO schemes in particular.170  Certainly, 
citizens everywhere have little say in how emissions targets are set or what 
kinds of offsets or trading are permitted between nations. 
I thus believe the many current CDM and voluntary schemes violate 
the emerging international environmental law principle for full participation 
by all concerned citizens in environmental decision making, and violate the 
fundamental human rights to participate and to access information about 
matters that affect other fundamental rights.  While private actors may not 
be directly liable for customary international environmental law principles,171 
host nations are required to protect their citizens from human rights 
violations of private actors acting in their territory and home states are 
required to monitor human rights violations committed by private actors 
operating from their states.172 
FCOs and CBDR 
As discussed above, Northern nations are legally obliged under the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and under customary international environmental 
law to fund mitigation and adaptation strategies in the South that will help 
avoid human rights and ecological cataclysms that result from the North’s 
responsibility for creating global climate change. 
FCO projects that respect CBDR and genuinely mitigate Northern 
emissions while helping the South adapt to global climate change would 
help fulfill this obligation; but projects that allow Northern actors to evade 
mitigate or adapt to climate change . . . .”  Art 4(1)(f).  This language is convoluted 
and vague, and it does not require EIAs of individual projects. 
169. Or assuming they can actually find the PDD.  As I note below, PDDs for
proposed CDM FCO projects are unavailable on the UNFCCC’s website; Kenneth 
Berlin, Arresting Climate Change. SL098 ALI-ABA 79, 87 (2006). 
170. Griffiths, supra note 23, at 12, 14.
171. Muchlinski, supra note 18, at 572.
172. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 1004); Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N. Doc. 
E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 179-181 (Cambridge, 2005). 
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their legal responsibility to reduce their own emissions, and that further 
undercut the South’s ability to adapt, violate the equity-enhancing 
underpinnings of CBDR. 
Even if they never explicitly cite the legal requirements of CBDR, the 
managers of the World Bank’s various Carbon Funds acknowledge the 
obligation that better-off States and private interests have to help the poor. 
But in Guangxi, international funds provided by state and corporate actors 
benefit private timber financial interests who are likely to profit 
disproportionately from the CERs generated (as compared to members of 
the communities whose land is used for the plantations and whose labor 
may be compensated as forest laborers).  The Carbon Funds help Northern 
entities avoid reducing GHG emissions, and thus continue to profit from 
their polluting industrial activities.  In both China and Tanzania, to the 
extent that sustainable development may occur, it seems ancillary, and such 
goals are certainly not transparent or verifiable.  In the decade since the 
Kyoto Protocol was signed, rather than the rich helping the poor under the 
legal mandate of the CBDR principle, the rich have exploited the climate 
change legal regime to accrue wealth at the expense of the poor, as we shall 
now see. 
Turning Carbon into Cash 
At the Bali UNFCCC COP, Northern nations, pressed by their private 
businesses, pushed hard for deals to extend the amount and kinds of FCOs 
allowed under the Kyoto Protocol and its successor.173  Adam Nathan, 
communications director of the Carbon Markets Association, asserted that 
“[n]egotiations in Bali cannot afford to fail,” as Kyoto nations are earning 
billions of dollars of carbon credits under the current flexibility mechanisms. 
For example, the E.U. gave away – free of charge – emissions trading credits 
to over 11,000 companies, who thus received free assets – rather than 
penalties or reduction mandates – for their polluting activities.174  A list of 
the NGOs accredited to participate at UNFCCC conferences reveals a huge 
array of business and trade organizations; these meetings resemble trade 
conventions as much as they do environmental meetings.175 
Much FCO financing comes from private investors, who do not see 
themselves as bound by Kyoto Protocol Article 10’s requirement that parties 
take local sustainable development priorities into account,176 whose 
required adherence to CBDR is questionable, and who stand to make 
173. Revkin, Bali, supra note 84.
174. Id.
175. UNFCCC, Parties & Observers, Civil Society, Admitted NGO,
http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/ngo.pl (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
176. Nelson, supra note 8, at 636.
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considerable money from FCO schemes.177  The regulatory complexity of 
FCOs allows Northern parties to push for speed and ease over careful 
attention to human rights norms, and makes it unlikely that Southern 
parties will have the institutional capacity to negotiate adequately or 
enforce human rights norms.178 
Next I will turn to some of the private investors who profit from the 
new commodity called carbon. 
Project Developers 
The Uchindile project is proposed by Green Resources, Ltd., a 
Norwegian company that has purchased the land in Tanzania and will own 
the CERs resulting from the reforestation project.179  Green Resources is a 
for-profit company that employs 1500 people and holds more than 100,000 
hectares of land in East Africa.180  Green Resources touts its mission “to fight 
climate change through highly efficient afforestation181 projects that at the 
same time benefit the poorest people in the world.”182  Green Resources 
aims to be Africa’s “leading provider of carbon offsets.”183 
Green Resources is the new name of another Norwegian company, 
TreeFarms.184  Green Resources in turn possesses another subsidiary, Sao 
Hill Industries, which “aims to be the leading forest products, building 
material and transmission pole company in Eastern Africa.”185  In this case, 
the raw material is trees, and sequestered carbon is among the many “forest 
177. Revkin, Bali, supra note 84.
178. Baumert, supra note 17, at 396.
179. PDD Uchindile supra note 55, at 100, 129; Lohmann, supra note 55, at 242.
180. Green Resources:  Company Strength, http://www.greenresources.no/
Company/Strength/tabid/95/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
181. In FCO language, afforestation is “The direct human-induced conversioin
of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land 
through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources.”  UNEP CDM Legal Guide, supra note 8, at 7. 
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. GREEN RESOURCES, SUMMARY OF THE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR UCHINDILE FOREST 
PROJECT (2007), http://www.greenresources.no/Portals/0/MP%20Summary%20for%20UFP.pdf.  
While the two businesses are listed separately on that PDD, Tree Farms now seems to 
have changed its name to Green Resources, merging the two businesses.  See Green 
Resources:  Green Resources’ Shares, http://www.greenresources.no/Company/Shares/ 
tabid/90/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
185. Green Resources:  Business Strategies, http://www.greenresources.no/
Company/BusinessStrategies/tabid/88/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
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products” it sells.  If approved, the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol would help 
Green Resources sell validated carbon; i.e., a new “forest product.” 
As TreeFarms has purchased land across East Africa, it has sought to 
reshape human and ecological communities in order to earn profits for itself 
and its investors.  TreeFarms has been implicated in schemes that severely 
undercut the ability of already poor people to make a basic living.  In 
Uganda, TreeFarms plantations – on land purchased for low prices from the 
government – fomented widespread eviction and social unrest.186  Of course, 
from the project documents, it is difficult to determine who would be liable 
should human rights violations occur, or should the carbon allegedly 
sequestered not materialize or be destroyed through fire or vandalism.  We 
know that Green Resources is related to TreeFarms only because they are 
both listed on the PDD.  Only a parenthetical phrase on Green Resources’ 
website mentions the connection.187 
Janet Dine argues that “property” is not rights over things but rights 
over people; She urges us to believe that the greater the power conferred to 
the owner of that property right, the greater the responsibilities that the 
property “owner” undertakes.188  Dine writes: “Of course, where the relevant 
item is food or water, the freedom and liberty inherent in exercise of 
property rights becomes a death warrant of those whose access to the item 
is thereby restricted.”189  In Uganda, people were thrown off their land and 
disconnected from their only source of food.190  In Tanzania, while TreeFarms 
had promised steady employment to replace traditional grazing land, they 
were only hiring local people to plant between December and March, and 
were paying less than $US1 a day.191  Because land tenure was traditional 
and not formal (i.e., no property deeds conferring a Northern notion of 
property ownership), it is estimated that the villagers have lost more than 30 
percent of their grazing and cropland, and some have not been compensated 
for this loss.192  The PDD does report some of the uncharitable things local 
villagers have to say about Green Resources,193 and reports from a survey 
that 41 percent of locals said wages were low or paid late, and 38 percent 
186. Lohmann, supra note 55, at 238-240.
187. Green Resources’ Shares, supra note 180.
188. DINE, supra note 172, at 172.
189. Id.
190. Lohmann, supra note 55, at 237-46.
191. Lohmann, supra note 55, at 242.  Lohmann discusses in some detail multiple
examples of FCOs that have disinvested local citizens of land and livelihood. 
192. PDD Uchindile, supra note 55, at 84.
193. Id. at 94-95.
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said the company had not fulfilled promises it made when it acquired local 
land.194 
In Tanzania, TreeFarms leased its land from the government at  
$US1.90 a year for 99 years.195  For the $US565,000 it will pay to Tanzania over 25 
years, the company stands to make around $US27 million by selling carbon 
offsets.196  It may be that Tanzania is part of a “race to the bottom” to become a 
new kind of “pollution haven,”197 allowing the North to continue to pollute the 
global atmospheric commons through cheap offsets that provide desperately 
needed FDI.  At any rate, this Northern company stands to benefit handsomely 
from carbon, and the benefits to local Tanzanians seem small. 
Northern Industries/Offset Purchasers 
In addition to the value of forest products it would gain once any 
carbon offset contracts were completed, TreeFarms signed an options 
contract for $US4.50 per tonne of carbon with Industrikraft Midt-Norge, a 
Norwegian power company.198  Why would Industrikraft Midt-Norge have 
wished to purchase this carbon to be sequestered from reforestation at a 
remote location in Tanzania?  The company sought to build two large gas-
fired power plants in Norway, which alone would have increased Norway’s 
GHG emissions 29 percent, and of course would have generated large profits 
for the company.199  The corporation convinced various players in the 
Norwegian government that they could offset new GHG emissions through 
saving carbon cheaply in the South, such as through TreeFarms’ FCOs.200  
Due in part to negative publicity about TreeFarms’ Uganda project,201 
Industrikraft Midt-Norge seems to have withdrawn from purchasing these 
particular FCOs; but the company’s website does assert that it will 
“implement measures to compensate for its own CO2 emissions” within the 
Kyoto Protocol framework, i.e., it will buy other CERs from other projects, 
194. Id. at 94.
195. Lohmann, supra note 55, at 242.
196. Id.
197. Muchlinski, supra note 18, at 543.
198. Lohmann, supra note 555, at 242.
199. Jorn Stave, Carbon Upsets:  Norwegian “Carbon Plantations” in Tanzania,
at 7, NorWatch, (July 2000),  http://www.norwatch.no/download-document/15-caron-
upsets-norwegian-carbon-plantations-in-tanzania.html. 
200. Erasker, supra note 147.
201. E.g. Lohmann, supra note 555, at 239-245.
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thus guaranteeing continued pollution through perpetuation of the 
unsustainable fossil fuel economy of the North.202 
Other offset purchasers in the “voluntary market” include other 
industries looking for inexpensive ways to meet government-imposed 
emissions reductions targets, businesses looking to gain positive publicity 
by investing in high-profile carbon storage projects, and consumers looking 
to offset their carbon-intensive lifestyles.203 
Carbon Funds 
Business is also booming for full-service carbon brokers, financial 
institutions, and lawyers.  As of 2006, 50 different carbon funds were buying 
and selling CERs, either to entities who required reductions to meet GHG 
reduction targets, or to speculators for whom “the CDM is seen as a financial 
opportunity, similar to those in other commodity markets.”204  For example, 
London-based Climate Change Capital “advises and invests in companies 
who recognise that combating global warming is both a necessity and an 
economic opportunity.  Its activities, which also include investment 
management and financing emissions reductions, aim to make the world’s 
environment cleaner while delivering attractive financial returns.”205  
Traditional investment firms are getting into the carbon commodity 
business.  For example, Merrill Lynch, in association with Australian 
business Carbon Conservation, has just announced that it is financing a 
high-profile, $US9-million deal to prevent deforestation on nearly 2 million 
acres in Aceh, Sumatra.206  Merrill Lynch hopes to sell the carbon credits (for 
which they’re paying $US4 each) at a profit, and Carbon Conservation hopes 
to “become the amazon.com of the Amazon.”207 
A carbon fund may well buy, and then resell, Green Resources’ CERs. 
From the seeds planted in Tanzanian pasture sprouts storage units for 
202. Industrikraft Midt-Norge:  Owners, http://www.industrikraft.no/english/
index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
203. Kanter, supra note 109; Katherine Hamilton, Ricardo Bayon, & Amanda
Hawn, ‘Carving a Niche for Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets’ in Streck et al., 
supra note 23 at 293; Clean Air – Cool Planet, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO RETAIL 
CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS (2006) at iii, available at http://www.cleanair-
coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsets.pdf. 
204. Mark Meyrick, What is a Fair Price for CDM Credits?, in EQUAL EXCHANGE, supra
note 11, at 102-03. 
205. Careers, Climate Change Capital, http://www.climatechangecapital.com/
pages/jobdetail.asp?id=533& (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
206. Gunther, supra note 114.
207. Id.
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carbon, a new commodity that can be repeatedly bought and sold for a profit 
in international markets. 
Law Firms 
Many corporate law firms are positioning themselves as advisors to 
governments and “deep pocket” investors who are looking to understand, 
and profit from the CDM and voluntary carbon markets.208  For example, 
Clifford Chance will “advise on climate change issues. . . to help in future-
proofing your business and maximizing opportunities;”209  The PDD does not 
reveal who has been advising TreeFarms, but it is a good bet they have 
carbon lawyers on retainer.  
Designated Operational Entities, Standards Certifiers, and 
Consultants 
The FCO system benefits another class of private enterprises that verify 
technical standards in projects or consult with project developers to help 
them navigate the abstruse technical and legal requirements. 
An Executive Board (“EB”) accredits proposed projects under the 
CDM.210  The CDM EB is underfunded and overburdened with duties, and 
thus contracts out verification and certification to private firms known as 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs); i.e., private companies who are 
market actors.211 NGOs sometimes allege that global accounting and 
standards firms are “captured” by their clients.212  Such enforcement “can 
take place in a club-like atmosphere of repeat players with a stake in 
maintaining their reputation within an industry.”213  Carbon verifiers or 
consultants may act as a DOE for a given project, but be a project broker, 
certifier, or consultant for different carbon offset projects; thus DOEs who 
wish to be hired in the future have a strong incentive to verify proposed 
CDM projects to maintain collegial relationships with prospective 
employers. 
TÜV SÜD, based in Germany but with offices at 130 sites worldwide, is 
the DOE for both the China and Tanzania projects.  It has 10,000 employees 
210. Benedict Kingsbury, Environmental Governance As Administration, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 63, supra note 5, at 75. 
211. Id. at 76; Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties:  Evolving
Debates on CDM Forest and Forestry Project Activities 10 Years After the Kyoto Protocol 144, 147 
(Pace U. Sch. Of Law, Working Paper Series 2007), available at http://ssrncom/ 
abstract=1011187. 
212. Ratner, supra note 20, at 823.
213. Id. at 824.
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and earned more than $US1 billion in 2005.214  It is both a DOE verifier and a 
project broker, having worked on over 200 climate change projects in over 30 
countries.215  It is the only CDM accreditor for FCOs under the Kyoto 
Protocol.216  (For most CDM projects, yet an additional DOE must be hired to 
verify that GHGs were actually reduced.217  It is not clear how this will work 
for FCO CDM projects, given that only one DOE has been certified.) 
TreeFarms has also employed the consultancy services of SGS, a 
Swiss-based multinational enterprise whose $US4.3 billion a year 
verification, testing, and certification business is rapidly expanding into the 
carbon project verification and advisory market.218  SGS sometimes serves as 
a DOE, but also works with companies to help them comply and plan their 
CDM projects.219  (A company cannot do both on one CDM project, except for 
small-scale forestry projects.220)  Consultants such as SGS have sometimes 
been paid in carbon offset reduction “Certified Emissions Reduction” units, 
giving them a greater financial stake in generating as many CERs as 
possible.221 
Thus multiple corporate entities may profit handsomely from this FCO. 
In the financial market that has sprung from the global climate change legal 
regime, trees have become greenhouse gas storage devices; quanta of 
carbon are now commodities that can be exchanged multiple times to profit 
disparate actors.  Among those profiting less are the government of 
Tanzania, which receives very little financial benefit; the local people seem 
to profit even less.  Underlying all of this is the startling realization that even 
under the most optimistic projections, no GHG reductions result for CDM 
FCOs under the Kyoto Protocol.  Carbon offsets merely allow the same 
amount of continued GHG emissions in the North.  MNEs need not change 
how they do business, need not develop the technologies that will foment a 
transition from a fossil fuel economy.  FCOs and other carbon offsets 
214. CDM Information Platform, Office of National Coordination on Climate




217. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 15, at 50-1.
218. See PDD Uchindile, supra note 55, at 5, 37 for SGS involvement; see also
http://www.climatechange.sgs.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008); and SGS, SGS 2007
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2008), http://www.sgs.com/sgs_2007_fyr_en.pdf. 
219. SGS, SGS CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 3, 6 (2005), http://wwwclimate
change.sgs.com/sgs_climate_change_program.pdf. 
220. Id.
221. Martijn Wilder & Monique Willis, CER Pricing:  Legal Influences, in EQUAL
EXCHANGE, supra note 9, at 28. 
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present new and innovative ways to profit by inventing and controlling new 
forms of property in faraway lands, often at the expense of people who 
hitherto had competing claims to that property.222 
Standard Setting and Regulation 
Validation as a CDM project requires meeting technical requirements 
about carbon calculation, leakage, and additionality.223  The standards for 
what counts as “sustainable development” or for what project participants 
have to do to ensure socioeconomic benefits of local communities are more 
ambiguous.224  The approved methodologies for reforestation for CDM 
projects do not include social or human rights criteria.225  CDM projects 
must take into account comments of local participants, but need not heed 
those or cancel a project if local opposition is strong.226 Although the CDM 
subjects MNE project developers to “hard” obligations,227 the standards that 
regulate those obligations are lax, and, as noted above, the standards are 
monitored by MNEs who may have self-interested business reasons for not 
monitoring too closely. 
The WWF and other NGOs have developed a “gold standard” tool that 
can be used by CDM project developers to develop “quality” carbon offsets. 
The Gold Standard has stricter “additionality” requirements and attends to 
some sustainable development goals: for example, project developers must 
“invite” local people to two consultations on the project (which they would 
not have to do otherwise for a normal CDM project).228  However, FCOs are 
not eligible to use this tool.229 
Voluntary market FCOs are subject to no mandatory regulations.  Into 
this breach launches a number of private initiatives designed, and 
sometimes competing, to regulate these projects.  The social and 
222. Lohmann, supra note 55, and Griffiths, supra note 23 document this
proposition extensively. 
223. Baumert, supra note 17, at 373.
224. Id. at 399.
225. UNFCC CDM, Methodologies, Afforestation / Reforestation Methodologies,
Approved A/R Methodologies, http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/ 
approved_ar.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
226. Schwartz, supra note 159, at 470-71.
227. Muchlinski, supra note 18, at 570.
228. The Gold Standard Fdn., Introducing the Gold Standard, http://www.
cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/CS_intro.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
229. THE GOLD STANDARD FDN., THE GOLD STANDARD MANUAL FOR CDM PROJECT
DEVELOPERS 9 (version 3, 2006), http://www.gov.mu/portal/goc/menv/files/cdm/ 
MATERIALS/Gold%20Standard.pdf. 
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environmental standards generated by the Climate, Community & 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) are the most rigorous I have read, and also self-
billed as “the most widely used and respected international standard,” with 
nine projects being validated and about 100 more in the pipeline.230  The 
CCBA seeks to “[i]dentify projects that simultaneously address climate 
change, support local communities and conserve biodiversity” and 
“[m]itigate risk for investors and increase funding opportunities for project 
developer[s].”231  Like other environmental certification schemes (e.g., the 
Forest Stewardship Council’s sustainable timber certification), project 
developers using these standards hope they promote stability and connote 
quality, and thus will fetch premium prices from sophisticated consumers.232  
For example, the CCBA standards guide Merrill Lynch’s Sumatra FCO;233 by 
using the standards, Merrill Lynch invests in “exceptional, high-quality (and 
resilient) projects most likely to avoid implementation roadblocks and 
deliver their stated outcome, including generating credible and robust 
carbon offsets.”234 
Developers using CCBA’s 2008 draft standards can earn two different 
levels of certification, with the “gold” level reserved for projects that 
demonstrate some “extra” combination of, among others, “exceptional 
community benefits” (including being “explicitly pro-poor”), “exceptional 
biodiversity benefits,” and “climate change adaptation benefits” (focusing on 
projects that “will provide significant support to assist local communities 
and/or biodiversity to adapt to the impacts of climate change”).235  This 
means that projects can be approved for CCBA certification and not meet 
these requirements.  Still, both standards employ rigorous methodologies 
to measure leakage, prevent false additionality, result in net gains for 
biodiversity, and guarantee net climate benefits.236  Furthermore, for basic 
certification, project developers must result in “net positive community 
impacts for each constituent socioeconomic or cultural group,”237 account for 
230. CCBA, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY, & BIODIVERSITY PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 4
(Draft Second Edition, Version 2.0 2008), http://www.climate-standards.org/ 
standards/thestandards.html. 
231. Id.
232. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard
Setting in  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, supra note 5, at 504; see 
Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
233. Gunther, supra note 114.
234. CCBA, CCB STANDARDS (2007), http://www.climate-standards.org/pdf/
2007_11_02_CCBS_factsheet_Web.pdf. 
235. Id. at 31-33.
236. Id.
237. Id., at 24.
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and mitigate offsite impacts238 and have a monitoring plan for onsite project 
community impacts.239 
CCBA standards are apparently being used in the Tanzania project.  In 
fact, the CDM project documents do not specify the source of standards they 
are using.  Only by reading the CCBA website do I find that they cite the 
Tanzanian project as using their standards.240  
CCBA is a partnership between NGOs (e.g., CARE, The Nature 
Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society), research institutions, and 
corporations.241  The latter includes BP, Intel, SC Johnson, Weyerhaeuser, 
and carbon-related businesses that stand to profit from FCOs like 
Sustainable Forestry Management242 and GFA Consulting Group.243  Groups 
like TNC or CARE wish to implement some form of regulation that support 
their goals – preserving biodiversity or alleviating poverty.  Carbon 
businesses may accept such voluntary regulation in order to advertise their 
corporate social responsibility to consumers, to show that industry can 
regulate itself (thus obviating the need for more formal legal strictures), and 
to invest in carbon offsets that are of recognized quality, thus generating 
CERs that fetch higher prices.244 
While potentially solving some problems, voluntary standards may 
raise others.  Will the NGOs or standards writers or certifiers involved be 
liable if human rights abuses (e.g., evictions from land, starvation) occur as 
a result of these FCOs?  Will a participating NGO be co-opted by the 
partnership and no longer be able to advocate and critique objectively the 
238. Id., at 25.
239. Id., at 26.
240. CCB Projects, supra note 163.   I find no mention of any standards at all,
beyond the technical calculations the CDM requires.  In fact, only on the CCBA 
website did I actually find the PDD, and I appreciate the CCBA’s contribution to 
transparency; I could not locate the PDD on the UNFCCC project webpage, another 
problem for “environmental democracy!” 
241. CCB: Members, http://www.climate-standards.org/pdf/2007_11_02_ 
CCBS_factsheet_Web.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
242. Sustainable Forestry Management’s “principal revenues will be derived
from supplying and trading carbon dioxide emission credits and offsets in the carbon 
market and from the harvest of environmentally certified timber,” Sustainable 
Forestry Management:  About Us, http://www.sfm.bm/Home/AboutF.htm (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2008). 
243. GFA Consulting Group’s business dealings include forest certification and
carbon brokerage and advising. GFA Consulting Group:  Business Areas, http://www. 
gfa-group.de/indices/home_index_sgf_953162.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
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possible damaging aspects of these FCOs?245  MNEs are driven to achieve 
maximum economic value for their stakeholders: Will these MNEs apply 
voluntary regulatory brakes when profits are at stake?  Furthermore, do these 
kinds of standards contravene the legal obligations that states have to 
regulate their own environmental and human rights destinies?246  Who will 
enforce the standards and impose penalties if the project developer doesn’t 
deliver on its promises?247 
 Private codes may result in environmental protections as rigorous as 
more formal, state-run legal codes; and, indeed, the CCBA’s standards do 
provide stricter protections than those named under the formal climate legal 
regime.  But, such voluntary codes nonetheless may reflect fewer non-
business interests (e.g., promoting human rights or environmental pro-
tection), and will be less likely to be enforced through the state’s official 
legal mechanisms.248  That may be precisely the point – as Morrison & Roht-
Arriaza express it, such standards “seek to change behavior through a 
complex mix of incentives and do not rely primarily on external, deterrence-
based enforcement.”249 Forces behind these codes may indeed be seeking to 
shape the content of future, formal legal standards.250  If shown to work, the 
voluntary standards would present a low-cost regulatory option for 
participating private actors – low cost because it has already been 
developed and shown to work, and is already in effect for private actors who 
are designing and implementing their methodologies. 
 Whatever the incentive for participants in the CCBA or other 
voluntary standards, for FCOs, the CCBA’s code is more rigorous and affords 
more protections – for forests, for local people – than any existing formal 
legal standards, including those of the CDM.  As in any new legal/policy 
instrument, CCBA’s standards may not work perfectly at present.  Of the 
three comments received during the Uchindile public participation process 
(and again, these comments are available and transparent on the CCBA’s 
website, not the UNFCCC’s website), one anonymous submission called into 
question the financial aspects of the plan, and alleged the project is non-
additional, given that Green Resources’ Sao Hill timber subsidiary is still 
operating in the area and might well continue to operate even without CDM 
approval.  Furthermore, 
[t]he monitoring of sustainable development criteria is lacking in the 
CDM, but an additional endorsement by CCB certainly requires adequate 
245. Muchlinski, supra note18, at 554-5.
246. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 232, at 526.
247. Id. at 524.
248. Ratner, supra note 20, at 820.
249. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 232, at 499.
250. Ratner, supra note 20, at 819.
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009 
81 
provisions for the inclusion and benefit of affected rural villages.  Many 
villagers, as reported in the PDD, feel that Green Resources has broken 
promises it made when the village decided to cede its customary land to 
the district council for allotment to Green Resources. . . .  Uchindile 
villagers have no ownership of the carbon, no ownership of the trees, and 
no ownership of the profits derived from harvesting.251 
Clearly, even the additional voluntary safeguards on top of the CDM’s 
lax safeguards mean that MNEs, as they stake out new legal and physical 
territory in host nations, may still be evading formal regulation that protects 
the climate, forests, and local communities.  This does not mean the CCBA’s 
standards themselves fall short; but it does suggest that those standards 
may need tighter oversight in how they are verified, implemented and 
monitored.  Currently, if an FCO in the voluntary market uses a voluntary 
standards instrument but then violates those standards, who will hold them 
to their word?  What domestic or international legal forum will enforce a 
voluntary code of conduct? 
In FCOs, so much is at stake – global profits, local livelihoods, human 
and ecological community survival – and so little formal domestic or 
international law regulates the actors who have much to lose and to gain. 
Conclusion: Moral Deflection Devices, Profit, International Law, 
and the Future of the Planet 
Writing about  the growing trend to transform water from a public 
good to a privatized resource, McDonald & Ruiters describe age of 
commodification, where: 
the transformation of all social relations to economic relations, 
subsumed by the logic of the market and reduced to the crude calculus 
of profit . . . Commodification entails the transformation of 
relationships, formerly untouched by commerce, into commercial 
relationships.  Under capitalism, many goods and services which 
previously had no market value or were self-provided within 
households have been brought into the market fold and mass 
production.  New commodities are created with the expansion of 
markets to new geographic areas and new sectors that may not yet 
have been marketized.252 
251. CCBA, Projects, Uchindile Public Comments, Comment No. 3, Sept. 5,
2007, http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/uchindile_comments.html. 
252. David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters, Introduction to THE AGE OF COMMODITY:  WATER 
PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 3, 21 (David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters, eds., 2005). 
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Goaded by scientists-turned-politicians and politicians-turned 
scientists,253 citizens have come to value carbon.  As carbon has become 
reified as a “thing” to be valued, it has acquired legal value, and has become 
subject to legal norms.  Carbon’s value was to be safeguarded using the 
guiding ethical and legal framework of CBDR.  But the legal norms have 
facilitated the transformation of carbon into a commodity with precious 
economic value.  FCOs have been labeled “CO2lonialism:” by securing large 
tracts of Southern forests, Northern consumers and industries can continue 
business as usual and need make no painful changes in lifestyle, or make 
the difficult investments to transition to a post-hydrocarbon economy.254  
Just as in traditional colonialism, once carbon was commodified, an array of 
actors has stepped in to profit from our concern, standing CBDR on its head 
by investing in Southern forests to ease transfer of wealth from South to 
North.  The mechanisms they have derived to finance adaptation to climate 
change – a mere 2 percent surcharge on profit-making CDM CERs, the 
voluntary market – often privilege financial profit for the North over genuine 
adaptation that foments social or ecological resiliency in the South. 
As long as they are traded for rights to continue to pollute, FCOs do 
not reduce global carbon emissions.  Thus far, too often they have been 
anti-democratic devices that forestall formal regulations, forestall a 
transition from a fossil fuel guzzling economy, and forestall development of 
new, Earth-friendly technologies.  If ever a multilateral environmental 
agreement had the potential to transform the legal environment around 
which private actors work across borders, the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol – 
designed to avert widespread global catastrophe to human and nonhuman 
communities – was it.  But the climate change legal regime has been co-
opted by commodification and profit, aided by Northern government leaders 
fearful of their own political futures, Northern consumers wishing to 
continue our own profligate lifestyles, Northern NGOs pursuing 
environmental or social goals through well meaning but sometimes myopic 
policies, Southern leaders who may profit individually from these deals or 
who may be desperate for FDI for their nations,255  World Bank officials 
pursuing development-as-usual, and, of course, all the private investors and 
shareholders who can benefit from a booming carbon industry unfettered by 
sufficient formal regulatory control.  Through forest carbon offsets, Northern 
private actors control lives and lands in impoverished nations whose 
253. Scientists have been issuing increasingly “heated” warnings on global
climate change in public, e.g. NAS, supra note 7; for an analysis of science as 
politicians on behalf of the environment, see DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY 
(1996).  For politicians turned scientists, see AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (2006). 
254. HUMPHREYS supra note 23, at 208; Lohmann, supra note 55, at 344; Erasker,
supra note 147.  
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communities have little ability to understand what is happening to them, 
never mind fight it. 
At the same time, tropical (and temperate) forests – with their 
beautiful species and robust ecosystems and ability to store carbon –
disappear at alarming rates.256  As they go, so goes the social and ecological 
resiliency that these forests provide, and thus neighboring humans also lose 
their ability to adapt to climate change. 
So what do we do?  If we care about mitigating greenhouse gas 
accumulation, helping poor (and wealthy) communities adapt, and 
preserving all of the values/services of forests, how can we make this 
happen? 
To assuage our guilt, some Northern consumers turn to voluntary 
offsets.  Like indulgences that wiped away sins in the Middle Ages, voluntary 
offsets illustrate “moral deflection devices,” instruments that allow us to feel 
better about ourselves while continuing to live lives that harm people far 
from our sights.257  But if we – we in the North who possess the wealth 
derived from exploiting the planet’s resources and fouling the global 
atmospheric commons – took the legal obligation of CBDR seriously, we 
would invest in forest carbon, but not as offsets that allow us to continue to 
pollute and allow the already-wealthy to profit from that pollution. 
Nations would have to commit to real, quantifiable, verifiable, stricter 
(than currently named) reductions in their GHG emissions.  That would 
mean placing real, quantifiable, verifiable, stricter restrictions on the 
industries that are primarily responsible for these emissions, and real, 
quantifiable, verifiable restrictions on citizen consumers who demand the 
products that lead industries to pollute.  It also means that Northern 
nations take responsibility to help Southern nations fulfill their own 
responsibilities to mitigate and adapt to climate change, through 
development and dissemination of clean technology and through direct aid 
that helps bolster social and ecological defenses against the coming climate 
change catastrophes that will disproportionately harm the Southern poor. 
This is real aid, guided by the principle of CBDR, over and above the meager 
2 percent-of-CERs fee that is currently placed on profit-generating CDM 
projects.  Only after that, within the formal strictures of a climate treaty, 
would nations be allowed to “offset” – and perhaps garner carbon credits 
they could sell on an open market.  This would give incentive to actually 
reduce GHGs, and would still provide a mechanism for investing in FCOs – 
256. Pagiola et al., supra note 88, at 1; Robert O’Sullivan, ‘Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation in Developing Countries: An Introduction’ in Streck et al, supra 
note 23, at 179; United Nations Environment Programme, Reducing Emissions From 
Deforestation: A Key Opportunity for Achieving Multiple Benefits 12 (Nairobi, 2007).   
257. Id., at 42.
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and the array of benefits they potentially provide – within the formal treaty 
regime. 
Citizens should demand that their nations’ stated GHG reduction 
commitments are real, verifiable, and quantifiable, strict, and not “offset” 
elsewhere.  They might demand rigorous adherence not just to CBDR, but to 
the preventative and polluter pays norms of international environmental 
law.  For example, the United States Superfund/CERCLA law imposed a tax 
on polluting industries that would be available for cleaning up toxic messes 
if the original polluter could not be found or could not pay.258  Why not a 
similar tax on the worst GHG emitters?  Exxon-Mobil’s profits in 2007 were a 
staggering $US40.6 billion dollars.259  A one-tenth-of-one-percent tax on 
those profits would net $US40 million from that one MNE alone – about the 
same amount as all Northern nations spent last year on total adaptation aid 
to Southern nations!260  Some proportion of this could be spent on carefully 
managed forest projects that preserve biodiversity at the same time they 
sequester carbon and help local communities adapt to climate change. 
Private actors seem not only to evade formal regulation of their 
activities; operating in a legal vacuum, they seem to have captured the 
regulatory apparatus, and with the aid of IFIs and NGOs, they are writing 
new regulations that allow them to profit from the GCC legal regime.  They 
have created a new industry worth billions of dollars.  Northern consumers 
abet this effort; we wish to continue our own over-consuming lifestyles that 
lead to excessive “luxury” emissions (as opposed to “survival” emissions 
from the South). 
But some voluntary standards, especially the gold certification level 
promoted by the CCBA, are nonetheless superior to a weak formal 
international legal regime that neither has named strict standards nor 
evolved a regulatory apparatus capable of regulating private actors in the 
CDM or voluntary market for FCOs.  Thus the voluntary standards emerge as 
valuable tools we can use both as legal mechanisms in their own right, and 
as templates for formal international legal efforts to derive rules for 
regulating FCOs such that they genuinely mitigate GHGs, and help Southern 
human and nonhuman communities adapt to climate change. 
Lawyers interested in environmental preservation and human rights 
have an obligation in all this.  Global climate change and deforestation, like 
so many other global problems, points to the absence of a robust system of 
international environmental law, with no rigorously codified, precise 
258. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9613(f) (2006). 
259. Steven Mufson, Exxon Mobil’s Profit in 2007 Tops $40 Billion, WASHINGTON 
POST, Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2007/02/01/AR2007020100714.html. 
260. See note 79 above where I cite this figure.
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principles and concrete means of enforcement.  The Preventative and 
Polluter Pays Principles, the emerging norms of Environmental Democracy, 
and, especially, CBDR, must be made more precise and thus justiciable by 
citizens anywhere whose legal rights are violated by unjust FCOs (or any 
other environmental norm violation).  Lawyers can help national leaders 
craft legal responses that indicate that governments believe these norms are 
binding opinio juris.  As such, these norms must find their way into the 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol and other multilateral environmental 
agreements.  Lawyers can help design strict forms of enforcement through 
an international body attached to the UNFCCC or through domestic 
applications.  These norms should become cornerstones of domestic and 
international policy, the standards by which all policy and actions are 
judged. 
The voluntary market continues to hold promise as a way to mitigate 
greenhouse gas buildup, help poor communities adapt, fulfill the mandates 
of CBDR, and preserve all the values of forests.  Several sets of competing 
regulatory standards are vying for market share.  I would suggest the COP to 
the UNFCCC come up with one set of standards, perhaps drawing from the 
best of the voluntary standards, but with stronger principles for respecting 
local human rights.  The CCBA standards – particularly their gold level – 
seem a good place to start, as these standards do attend not only to 
ecological values that forests provide, but also to the needs of people 
dependant on those forests.  If reality does not always live up to the promise 
of the norms for regulating a nascent commodity in this nascent industry – 
as the Tanzania case study above suggests – that does not mean that stricter 
guidelines, stricter monitoring, and stricter enforcement could not improve 
application of these norms. 
Furthermore, the future of FCOs should lie not in “junk” carbon, but 
rather in “boutique” carbon, i.e., asking citizens and corporations to take 
CBDR as an ethical and legal principle seriously, and invest in the best 
possible FCOs to preserve the forests that help communities adapt and that 
preserve biodiversity, but do so without destroying local livelihoods, and 
doing so in a way that generates profits for – and derives from the wishes 
of – local communities.  Particularly were these boutique carbon FCOs to 
command higher prices on an international market, they could then become 
the standard,261 crowding out the market in inferior FCOs that neither offer 
genuine adaptation nor assurances that local people derive the bulk of the 
benefits and guide the direction of the deals. 
Lawyers ought to comment more frequently and more rigorously on 
proposed CDM FCO (or other kinds of CDM) projects that seem 
questionable from scientific, legal (environmental or human rights) or 
261. This is what Merrill Lynch is banking on in their Sumatra deal.  Gunther,
supra note 114. 
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ethical perspectives.  A first step would be to demand that the CDM EB 
actually post these proposed projects where they are legally required to do 
so!  When the EB makes decisions that we feel fulfill neither the Kyoto 
Protocol’s explicit legal norms nor the customary norms of international 
environmental law, we can appeal the EB’s decisions.  We can use existing 
international human rights law mechanisms to complain about FCOs that 
do not protect human rights.  While private actors notoriously elude 
international human rights law duties, all nations have a duty to respect, 
protect, and fulfill human rights.  When Southern nations allow FCOs that 
force people off their land, they are failing in their duty to respect; i.e., they 
are directly denying human rights to their people.  When they fail to control 
FCOs through legislation and policies, they are failing in their duty to protect 
their peoples’ human rights.  When Northern nations allow their private 
actors to avoid legal mandates through questionable human rights 
activities, they, too, are failing in their responsibilities to protect human 
rights.  Nations that do not proactively seek to regulate potential human 
rights activities of their private actors, even if they occur abroad, are evading 
their duty to fulfill human rights. 
We can use various human rights fora (e.g., complaint mechanisms) 
and regional courts, using Earthjustice’s landmark hearing on behalf of the 
Inuits before the Inter American Commission on Human Rights as one 
template.262  We can scrutinize Norway’s plans to become carbon neutral by 
investing over a half-billion per year in FCOs: if Norway is acting qua 
Norway, it must develop and follow a set of human rights principles to guide 
these offset projects.  We can more carefully codify CBDR commitments, 
both in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol and elsewhere, and pursue 
violations through the International Court of Justice.  Furthermore, if any of 
these FCOs occur in the 40 European nations who are signatories to the 
Aarhus Convention, we can investigate whether local people’s full rights to 
participate in environmental decision making have been observed, and file 
complaints accordingly.  New European-based public interest environmental 
law firms like Client Earth263 can bring suits against European nations (all of 
whom are Kyoto signatories) who are allowing their private actors to 
develop human rights violating projects and whose private actors are 
benefiting from trade in the E.U. trading scheme. 
262. Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions 
of the United States (submitted Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.earthjustice.org/library/ 
legal_docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-
of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf. 
263. See Client Earth, http://www.clientearth.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has proposed a set of legal 
norms to constrain the actions of transnational corporations.264  Ideally, 
these norms would confer rights to be held by individuals, justiciable in any 
domestic courts (or perhaps some international legal fora), actionable 
against private entities who transgress the norms.  These legal norms would 
bypass the legal stranglehold of nation states, who, as duty bearers and 
prosecutors under international law often lack the means or incentives to 
enforce them, and whose direct rights as nations are often not infringed by 
environmental transgressions.  Developing a legal system to guide FCOs and 
thus help people adapt to the ravages of global climate change while 
preserving the Earth’s gorgeous biological resources would be a good place 
to implement development of such norms.  We could start by forging a clear 
system of rights that must be respected when implementing FCOs, from 
which corresponding duties would inhere to all actors, state and non-state, 
who participate in such FCOs.  Or we could start by naming appropriate 
duties, applicable to all actors, and build a system of liability and 
enforcement to prevent and punish breaches of such duties.265 
Global climate change has the potential to turn the natural world on 
its head and to destroy human communities, rich and poor, which depend 
on the natural world.  To prevent these catastrophes, we need to turn the 
international legal world on its head.  We need a system of international law 
powerful enough to preserve at least slivers of forest, scraps of biodiversity, 
and shreds of human dignity.  The legal principles we need – preventative, 
polluter pays, environmental democracy and a host of environmental human 
rights, CBDR – are there, as are some strong codes of voluntary standards 
that provide a starting point for formal lawmaking.  Missing is precision, 
enforcement, justiciability and the will to shape and use international law to 
de-emphasize the nation state, and to tame “the market” and its relentless 
commodification of the Earth’s social and natural assets. 
264. U.N. Comm. On Human Rights [UNCHR], Sub-Comm. On the Promotion
& Protection of Human Rights, 55th session, Agenda item 4, Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/SUB.2/2003/12/REV.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). 
265. Ratner, supra note 20, at 827.
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